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26 George Lockhart of Carnwath, Memoirs (1714), App., pp. 405-20. That the inquiry found much that was amiss, see Parliamentary History, VI, 1110-6; but the matter was hushed up.


28 The full text is given in Sir Tresham Lever, Godolphin (1952), 180-1, citing R.M., Add. MS. 34, 180, fl.

29 P. Hume Brown, The Legislative Union of England and Scotland (1914), 33-4, 50 and 70; and R.H. Story, Life of Principal Castaeres (1874), 275-6. An earlier historian, still, Malcolm Laing, in his History of Scotland (1800), II, p. 374, Note VIII, observed that 'Never was a union purchased so cheaply'.


Through over-compression, I may in my article on 'The Making of the Union' have inadvertently misled here. The duration of the opposition is noted (e.g., art. cit., pp. 94, 96-7, 110) but should perhaps have been stressed more.

31 Riley, art. cit., English Historical Review, 499.


33 E.g., Memoirs of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik (Scottish History Society, 1892), 46-9; Sir David Hume of Crossrigg, Diary of Proceedings in Parliament (Banantick Club, 1828); and George Ridpath, An Account of the Proceedings of the Parliament of Scotland (1704), passim.

34 William Ferguson, Imperial Crowns: a neglected facet of the background to the Treaty of union of 1707, Scottish Historical Review, LIII (1974), 22-44.


38 Edward Hughes, The Negotiations for a Commercial Union between England and Scotland in 1668, Scottish Historical Review, XXIV (1927), pp. 30-47.


40 Theodora Keith, Commercial Relations of England and Scotland, 1600-1707 (1910), especially ch. IV.

41 A.M. Carstairs, 'Some Economic Aspects of the Union of the Parliaments', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, II (1955), pp. 64-72 is a brief but suggestive article which points out that colonial trade had, in the wake of the Darien Disaster, little appeal in Scotland.


Scotsmen and the British Diplomatic Service, 1714-1789

For the diplomatic historian, one particularly interesting consequence of the famous Anglo-Scottish incorporating Union of 1707, is the steady infiltration of Scotsmen into what, for the sake of convenience, may be described as the diplomatic service.1 Admittedly, even before the Union (after the decision of James I's judges in the post-natal case)2 there was no actual legal bar to Scotsmen holding office under the English crown but except in the army — always more cosmopolitan in membership and outlook than the civil service — these cases are relatively rare. Thus, Macky in his Secret Memoirs lists the principal diplomats at the start of Queen Anne's reign: among the twelve, not one is a Scot, yet in the army and navy, of the twenty-two leading generals and admirals, four and two respectively are Scotsmen.3 Only with the Union came the real influx of the Scottish element: a process of penetration that continued almost unbroken for over 60 years until by 1770, Scotsmen had charge of British relations with nearly every major European court. It is the object of this paper to provide an outline of this Scottish expansion abroad, to examine some of the reasons for it and to briefly evaluate the overall Scottish contribution to the conduct of British foreign policy during this period.

Modern historians now generally agree, that one key factor is reconciling the ablest Scots of all ranks and classes to the Union, was their growing conviction, that despite its defects, it offered opportunities, and outlet for ambition and industry not possible in an independent Scotland — in other words, the feeling that both jobs and
This is not to underestimate the fundamental importance of the PHIBB project being undertaken by P.J. Wallis and his team at Newcastle. As a list of their diverse publications proves, (Publications in historical bibliography, [Newcastle, 1977] PHIBB 160) the stimulus for serious work on book subscription lists has come largely from their computer based activity. Wallis is well aware of the hazards of over-simplification in this kind of study as is made clear in his talk to the Bibliographical Society, November, 1972, later published in The Library. (see fn. 14.)

13 E.g. R. Burns, The cowering's Saturday night, stanza 12.
14 Alexander Kincaid, His Majesty’s Printer and Stationer for Scotland, 1744-77.
15 Martin and Wooterspoon and John Reid are listed in a Dictionary of the printers and book-sellers who were at work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1726 to 1775, (Oxford, 1952). Scottish section by G.H. Bushnell.
16 Reid advertised in The Caledonian Mercury, April 15, 1765, that over 3,000 copies of the first six numbers had been sold, and that No. 7 would be printed in a larger impression, and Nos. 1 to 6 reprinted. He describes The Universal Bible as ‘the cheapest and most splendid that was ever offered to the public’. Martin & Wooterspoon’s counter-advertisement appeared April 37, 1765.
17 A copy of this subscription list is to be found in Dundee University Library.
18 One of the propositions of the ‘Aucheteran creed’ disapproved of by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1717.
20 Ebenezer Erskine (1680-1754), founder of the Scottish secession church. Ralph Erskine (1685-1757), seceding divine and poet, who joined his brother, Ebenezer, in the Associate Presbytery in 1737.
22 All my examples are taken from The Glasgow poet, ed. G. Eyre-Todd (Paisley 1906). An even wider range of examples of workman-poets educated in Scotland in the second half of the eighteenth century can be found in Charles Rogers, The Scottish minstrel: The songs of Scotland subsequent to Burns with memoirs of the poets. (London, 1876)
23 There is an account of Robert Mudie in W. Norrie, Dundee celebrities of the nineteenth century. (Dundee, 1973), 73-9.
25 Copy of the subscription list in the writer’s possession.

Recent Interpretations of the Making of the Treaty of Union of 1707

No attempt will be made here to give an account, far less an explanation, of the involved circumstances that gave rise to the Treaty of Union of 1707 between England and Scotland, which is variously called the union of the Parliaments, the Legislative Union or Incorporating Union. The making of that union has been in contention from Queen Anne’s day to our own, the current arguments about it having, for obvious enough reasons, increased in stridency over the past few years. That, however, is not the present concern. Instead, this paper proposes to examine some problems posed by different interpretations of the making of the union, interpretations that have varied for many reasons, some of which are historical and others anything but that.

Trouble has arisen, and still does, not just because the evidence, although voluminous, is not in certain respects as complete as could be wished, and indeed on some vital points dries up altogether. What, for example, are we to make of such a key figure as the leader of the anti-unionist groups in the last Scottish parliament, James, fourth Duke of Hamilton? We do not know, for the available evidence does not enable us to pluck the heart out of his mystery. Was he, as he would fain have appeared, a great patriot striving to preserve his country’s independence? Or was he a Jacobite intriguer (albeit of a peculiarly ineffective sort); or possibly even kingmaker on his own behalf, as the exasperated Sophia of Hanover wondered? Of Hamilton, we can suspect much and prove little. And so perforce, remote and sphinx-like that particular premier duke of Scotland remains, though there
are grounds for believing that, following family tradition, he was nothing more baffling than the Micawber of the piece. Nor is Hamilton's a singular case. On numerous other important issues and personalities connected with the making of the union, which cannot be considered at length here, light falls fitfully.

But the complexity of the matters involved in the making of the union — the confused and confusing interaction of intricate events, and occasional gaps in the evidence — are by no means the only, or perhaps even the most important, reasons for the present impasse. Possibly even more important in keeping the whole subject in a somewhat sterile ferment are the attitudes and motivations of historians. These, however, are rarely openly discussed. As factors they are not supposed to exist, and it is considered bad form to go on about them. Yet they undoubtedly exist, are of prime importance, and badly need to be discussed. This paper will touch upon them as they affect certain vital points.

Quite apart from any bias detectable in the work of individual historians, there are two general conditioned responses to the union of 1707 and its mode of production, and these tend to operate, more or less covertly, whatever value judgements are passed on the union whether as regards its making, its specific provisions or its long term effects. They are roughly, national, although not necessarily nationalist. They depend largely on the point of vantage: to people north of Tweed, the reign of Anne is virtually synonymous with the union of 1707, which dominates every other consideration; but south of Tweed, the union is dismissed either as manifest destiny or as a minor distraction. As T.C. Smout has put it, with truly Roman gravitas, 'to most Englishmen it is perhaps merely a formal episode in the transformation of their northern neighbours from barbarism to citizenship.' In less lofty language the union figures as little more than a ripple on the surface of English history, as Dr. Patrick Riley has recently emphasised, and as such it is usually given skimmed treatment by historians of England. In Scottish history, however, its importance, whether for good or for ill, tends to be writ large. Thus, for Professor Smout, the Act of Union of 1707 is at once a major event in the development of the British constitution and the great hinge on which the domestic history of Scotland turns, though recently he seems to have had second thoughts about the latter proposition. Still, his earlier attitude, that the union is 'the great hinge', is, if of dubious import and validity, at least well known and by no means confined to Professor Smout. According to this notion, developments in Scotland before the union are important if they seem to point to 1707, and eccentric if they do not.

In certain quarters this view now prevails. By it, all the forces that were to make the eighteenth century in Scotland the so-called 'Age of Improvement' (as if nothing had ever improved before) stem from 1707. Indeed, two leading exponents of this school, Mrs Rosalind Mitchison and Dr Nicholas T. Phillipson, in their preface to the collection of essays that bears that term of art as a title, spell the thesis out with startling baldness. By the union, we are told, 'Scotland was snatched from the relative cultural isolation in which she had passed the seventeenth century, and placed in the centre of the thinking world.' The contention is debatable, to say the least, and could almost with justification be reversed. But note the hauteur of English historians, which is never more conspicuous than in their treatment of Scotland and things 'Scotch'. On this occasion their prosopographical approach has me on the horns of a dilemma, for far be it from me to decry the eighteenth century. If I could allow myself the tax-free luxury of a fantasy life, remote from the woes that presently beset the fog islands, I should surely find it in that remarkable period. But ill-informed denigration of preceding ages, or come to that succeeding ages, adds not one whit to the achievements of the eighteenth century. It is hard to say exactly what Mitchison and Phillipson are getting at here, though in all probability they are simply extending their great mentor Professor Trevor-Roper's absurd caricature of Scotland in the seventeenth century, and in reaching the same plangent conclusions they display a similar tenuous grasp of the evidence. Their method of choice is a simple, not to say simple-minded, one: conclusion comes first, and all else is an after-thought.

Nonetheless, in all these writers the underlying sentiment is clear, and it carries an important implication. Without closer intercourse with England, and stimulus and direction from the same, Scotland could not have amounted to anything, however humble. Politically, economically and culturally she would have suffered from arrested development. And history has to be glossed to support this sweeping assumption. In this grand cause, for example, how often are such quintessential Scots as David Hume and Adam Smith transmuted into brilliant English philosophers. Lest this be deemed as
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exaggeration, read Alfred Cobban's chapter on the 'Enlightenment' in the New Cambridge Modern History, where Scotland is not even mentioned, though Hume, Smith and others receive their meed of praise.9

Here, in the work of Mitchison and Phillipson, we have a perfect illustration of the Anglomania that presently perverts Scottish studies — in Scotland, at any rate. But it is not the present purpose to expose the follies to which this gives rise, though that could easily be done — with eye-popping results. The point to stress here is that it is undoubtedly fashionable to assess developments in Anne's reign with 1707 as the pre-determined pivot. And not developments in Anne's reign alone. Thus, Smout shows us the road to union from 1603 to 1707, not it is true quite as straight as a Roman military way but just as relentless in its purpose. This may seem to do his essay, 'The Road to Union', scant justice, but later I hope to lay before you some of my reasons for rejecting his interpretation.

At this point I must apologise for allowing the naked 'ego' to intrude. You will know of course that we devotees of Clio are, like lago, 'nothing if not critical'. I am as critical as any, and as open to criticism as any. So the question naturally arises: what buzzes buzz under my bonnet? How can I come to see things so differently from my predecessors and so many of my contemporaries? Am I, too, thinking with my endocrine system? Very possibly this is the case, but, even if so, my endocrine system, entrails or whatever, have certainly been reinforced, if not governed, by other and more measurable considerations. In teaching the subject for many years I became increasingly uneasy about the received version of the union and its making, which was really of nineteenth-century provenance, as summarised, for example, in the attractively clear but oversimplified account by the late George Pryde.8 But it was not until I began to work on the original sources that my doubts really hardened, and, in spite of Professor Smout's views to the contrary, the late Sir Lewis Namier had nothing to do with it. The people who persuaded me that Pryde and the school he represented were wrong in many respects were in fact the principal union politicians themselves — Queensberry, Seafield, Argyll, Mar and Godolphin. No doubt they would have been flattered by their portraits as limned by such notable Whig artists as Trevelyan and Pryde, but I suspect that they would also have been gratified to observe that their warts had nearly all been carefully brushed out. Slowly I was driven to the conclusion that to assess developments in Anne's reign with 1707 as the predetermined pivot is simply to evade the real issues, and, further, that to assume that powerful parties in both kingdoms throughout strove consistently and with consummate statesmanship for incorporating union is to reject the known facts. Whatever the state of my psyche, it is my deeply held, and I hope ineradicable, prejudice that no historian worthy of his salt can do either. We deal with difficult matters, with questions that wishful thinking and rhetoric cannot answer, and the least we can do is to take the questions seriously and tackle the difficulties honestly.

The evidence mocks the easy assumptions I have been condemning. But, as I once put it, 'Few matters in Scottish history have been so abused by subjectivist and determinist interpretations as the Treaty of Union of 1707'.9 In that paper, delivered in 1962, my aim was to restore some of the lost mystery to the whole business, and, judging from audience reaction, I have never succeeded so well in anything I have undertaken.

I find it puzzling, therefore, to be taken to task by Professor Smout for failing to grasp the daunting complexity of the overall situation, the more so as his own writings on the subject scarcely reflect prolonged wrestling with the intractable sources.10 Smout, over the years, has given us variations on a theme — a crude economic interpretation which is in itself flawed, as I hope to demonstrate.

But that, for the moment, is by the way. To return to my earliest paper on the subject of the union, I observed that most writers have eloquently explained why a thing so desirable in itself as the union emerged naturally and, of course, with a stainless quality that was remarkably at odds with the political morality of the early eighteenth century. I further contended that the existing literature was marred by far too much lofty generalizing — the fruits of a tendency to philosophise on events rather than analyse their causes. In too many cases, it seemed to me (and still does) that this arose from refusal to examine the evidence coupled with a marked ability to glide round awkward matters. I ended, Cassandra-like, by predicting that the last had not been seen of such bad practices.

It was the safest of safe bets. The prediction has proved all too accurate. Professor Smout, arguing frantically in favour of economic determinism (a concept that does not perturb me in the least) and latterly, and somewhat incongruously, the imponderables of the
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For the diplomatic historian, one particularly interesting consequence of the famous Anglo-Scottish incorporating Union of 1707, is the steady infiltration of Scotsmen into what, for the sake of convenience, may be described as the diplomatic service. Admittedly, even before the Union (after the decision of James I's judges in the post-natus case)² there was no actual legal bar to Scotsmen holding office under the English crown but except in the army — always more cosmopolitan in membership and outlook³ — these cases are relatively rare. Thus, Macky in his Secret Memoirs lists the principal diplomats at the start of Queen Anne's reign: among the twelve, not one is a Scot, yet in the army and navy, of the twenty-two leading generals and admirals, four and two respectively are Scotsmen.⁴ Only with the Union came the real influx of the Scottish element — a process of penetration that continued almost unbroken for over 60 years until by 1770, Scotsmen had charge of British relations with nearly every major European court. It is the object of this paper to provide an outline of this Scottish expansion abroad, to examine some of the reasons for it and to briefly evaluate the overall Scottish contribution to the conduct of British foreign policy during this period.

Modern historians now generally agree, that one key factor is reconciling the ablest Scots of all ranks and classes to the Union, was their growing conviction, that despite its defects, it offered opportunities, and outlet for ambition and industry not possible in an independent Scotland — in other words, the feeling that both jobs and
economic progress must come from England. Indeed by mid-century, if not before, it had become more or less accepted, at least within progressive circles, that the only worthwhile career for a Scot was an English one. As R.R. Hepburn, M.P. for Kincardineshire put it:

"It is natural for people who can afford it to get near the seat of Government in England... you feel you are in a better country, amongst a richer and happier people. We are only fit to supply England with inhabitants and very few of those that can help it will ever return except for a visit."

From the first, however, available positions in England — in law, politics or the Church — were at such a premium and the number of prior English claimants with influence and connexion was so great that aspiring Scots had perforce to look elsewhere for advancement: either in the army or increasingly after 1707, the diplomatic service.

Here competition was less intense and opportunities correspondingly greater, because Englishmen, having more to keep them at home, were on the whole reluctant to accept appointments abroad or make a career in a service they considered unfashionable and unrewarding — a generalization that applies to the 17th and 18th centuries alike. No wonder that Chesterfield was moved to write:

"Most of our ministers abroad have taken up that department occasionally, without having ever thought of foreign affairs before; many of them without properly speaking any one foreign language; and all of them without the manners which are absolutely necessary towards being well received and making a figure at foreign courts. They do the business, accordingly — etat is, very ill... and at last, finding themselves very unfit for, soon grow weary of their commissions and are impatient to return home."

No doubt, James Hare expressed the prevailing opinion when he remarked that "he would rather be a commissioner of the customs in London than King of Poland if I were obliged to pass my life at Warsaw." John Locke was offered diplomatic posts at Berlin and Vienna and declined both on grounds of health yet eventually accepted the modest home appointment as Commissioner of Appeals. A little later, in Queen Anne's reign, Matthew Prior, envoy at Ratisbon writing to his patron Bolingbroke, begged his support for a position in England "because I should like that climate and employment preferable to any other." Much the same attitude prevailed under the Georges; indeed, among Peers employment abroad was becoming near synonymous with banishment. Thus, Lord Chesterfield regarded his first mission to Holland "as rather an honourable exile than a mark of favour", and it proved so difficult in 1766 to fill the Madrid embassy — several Lords having turned it down — that in the end a commoner was sent. Similarly, in 1787 Lord Walsingham more than gladly relinquished a prospective mission to Spain in exchange for the postmastership.

Even those young Englishmen of good birth who, all else failing did eventually accept an appointment abroad, saw it only as a temporary expedient, a stepping stone to a lucrative political or administrative career at home later on, and quite often required special inducements in the form of extra remuneration, retiring allowances, generous pensions from civil list revenues, a peerage or an elevation in the peerage as a condition of going to, remaining at or, on occasion, returning to a foreign court.

Inevitably, this aversion of native Englishmen towards foreign assignments and the personnel problems it caused, fostered the gradual penetration of the diplomatic service by alien elements — as under William III by Dutchmen, French huguenot refugees or Swiss Protestants, and in the later years of Anne's reign, by Scotsmen. Among the first appointed was the 2nd Duke of Argyll who held a semi-diplomatic appointment as ambassador to Spain; Admiral James Wishart who went on a special mission to Barcelona and later negotiated with the United Provinces over marine quotas; the Earl of Stair, briefly envoy to Poland and two obscure civilians, George MacKenzie and James Scott who represented British interests in Russia and Saxony respectively. Probably, this sudden Scottish accession was to some extent accidental, the result of wartime exigency — since most of the Scots employed had previously served in the army or navy and their missions were at least as much military or naval as diplomatic. Even so, a start had been made and certainly Scottish appointments continued in the ascendant well into the reign of George I. During the years 1714-1725, for instance, the Earl of Stair acquired the top post in the service — the embassy to France — with another Scot, Thomas Crawford as secretary, two Scots peers, Lord
Polwarth and John Campbell, Baron Glenorchy successively served as envoys to Copenhagen — a crucial spot during and immediately after the Northern War; James Haldane of Glenelg skillfully executed numerous missions to Russia, Hesse-Cassel and the Elector Palatine, while Alexander Cunningham was resident at Venice.

For the next two decades, however, especially once Walpole assumed control over foreign affairs, Scottish representation experienced a sharp decline, ceasing almost entirely, except for an occasional minor secretarial or consular appointment, until the nomination of Lord Hyndford as minister to Berlin in 1741, which turned out to be the first of a new series. Included here among others were also Sir James Gray, Resident in Venice from 1746-1753, John Burnaby, appointed minister to Switzerland in 1745, Viscount Stormont, Envoy Extraordinary to Poland (1756-65), James Stuart Mackenzie Envoy to Sardinia (1758-60) as well as two names particularly prominent in the annals of 18th century diplomacy: Robert Keith of Craig and Sir Andrew Mitchell.

Keith, like so many of his fellow diplomats — a graduate of Edinburgh University, owed his introduction to diplomacy to the 2nd Earl of Stair who took him to Holland and Germany as his private secretary, while Stair was in command of the Pragmatic Army and Ambassador to the States General.

He served in the same capacity with the Earl of Sandwich at the Hague and at the Congress of Aix la Chapelle and in 1748, was appointed British minister to Vienna, remaining there until 1757. The ability and diligence Keith displayed throughout, earned him honours and promotion, even though, in the end, he proved unable — due to factors outside his control — to preserve the traditional alliance with Austria or dissuade the Austrian foreign minister, Kaunitz, from veering towards France. Following the "Diplomatic Revolution" and the outbreak of the Seven Years War, Keith was transferred to St-Petersburg where he again served with distinction, playing a vital part in maintaining harmonious Anglo-Russian relations during a highly critical period, safeguarding English mercantile interests and in 1762, with the accession of Peter III hastening the peace between Russia and Prussia (then Britain's ally) — a service which won him the friendship of Frederick the Great. When shortly after, Peter III was deposed, Keith — never a partisan of the new ruler — Catherine II, requested and duly received his recall. He retired to Edinburgh, on a government pension of £1,000 a year, and devoted the remainder of his life to gardening and literature. His large circle of friends included Hume, Adam Smith and Dr. Robertson, with whom as "Ambassador Keith" he was extremely popular. Andrew Mitchell, also a native of Edinburgh was born on 15 April 1708. His father, the Rev. William Mitchell was minister of St. Giles, frequently Moderator of the General Assembly and chaplain in ordinary to George I. He entered Edinburgh University in 1723, took up the study of law and in 1725 was articled to an Advocate. He left Scotland in 1728, briefly visited Holland and Germany, then studied at Leyden and Utrecht, 1729-1731. After travelling for several years in Southern Europe, he returned to London, and in 1738 was called to the English Bar. In 1741, he obtained the post of private secretary to the 4th Marquis of Tweeddale and from 1742-1746 served as Under-Secretary for Scotland. His first diplomatic assignment dates from 1751, when he was appointed one of the two delegates sent to Brussels to participate in the deliberations for the settlement of the Barrier dispute. Though these were abortive, Mitchell's conduct so impressed his superiors that when early in 1756 someone was needed for the important embassy at Berlin he promptly received the post, (with Alexander Burnet, a fellow Scot, as Secretary) residing there until 1764 and again from 1766 to 1771. D.B. Horn believes — and I agree that Mitchell was by far the most successful British representative in Prussia during this period, a success largely due, no doubt, to his personal relationship with Frederick the Great, who trusted him, valued his judgement and — Mitchell being well read in literature and philosophy — enjoyed his company. During the Seven Years War, Mitchell attended the King on most of the campaigns and his letters and dispatches — frequently written on the field of battle — form a vivid chronicle of these events and often troubled years. When Mitchell died in Berlin, 26th January 1771, Frederick, who is said to have wept, expressed this tribute:

"His talents and character had wholly gained my esteem and he retained it to the end of his days. It will be difficult for the Court of London to find a successor of such distinguished and recognized merit."
Elsewhere on the continent, the Scots were more active than ever at this time. Thus about 1770, Lord Stormont was ambassador to Vienna and Lord Cathcart envoy extraordinary to Russia; Sir Robert Murray Keith, son of the elder Keith, was just beginning his illusory career as minister to Poland; Sir William Hamilton — also known for his learned works — had been at Naples since 1764, while William Gordon was minister plenipotentiary to Flanders. Around the late seventies the picture was still substantially the same. By then, Stormont had been promoted to the Paris embassy (assisted by William Fullarton, as ambassador secretary); his old post was filled by Robert Murray Keith, a newcomer Sir Robert Ainslie went to Constantinople, while the dynamic Hugh Elliot had replaced Mitchell at Berlin.

When our period ends in 1789, Sir Robert Murray Keith had served nearly 20 years as envoy to Vienna and Sir William Hamilton 25 years at Naples; Hugh Elliot — then at Copenhagen — had spent almost 15 years at different courts and Sir Robert Ainslie nearly as long at Constantinople; Joseph Ewart — former secretary to Keith had just been appointed envoy extraordinary to Berlin and Daniel Hailes was in Warsaw. Two other Scots, C.H. Fraser and William Lindsay held respectively minor posts as secretary of embassy at Madrid and secretary of legation in Russia.

This remarkable entrenchment of Scots into what was gradually becoming an honourable and relatively lucrative profession (not to mention their comparable success in other areas) did not escape the notice of English observers — indeed, it was a standing complaint — especially in governmental circles, and evidently a powerful stimulus behind that anti-Scottish feeling which to varying degrees pervaded every strata of English society during much of the 18th Century. Few contemporaries would have disagreed with the anonymous writer "Whipcord" when he observed:

"Let any dispassionate man, not a Scot, now consider the list of the very late appointments to our most lucrative governments and honourable embassies and then tell me if we are not a ruined and insulted people; if our honour is not lost, if the black whirlpool of the North has not borne down all before it and with unremitting fury levelled those venerable, patrician old English oaks which afforded shelter to our fathers in every storm...."
connections with influence at high levels. In the same way, control of a seat in the House of Commons or better still, a peerage, gave a would-be diplomat a great advantage over other competitors, hence it can hardly be coincidence that so many diplomatists throughout this period were peers or members of parliament [thus out of the 40 Scottish diplomatists serving the Crown between 1714 and 1789, 15 were the sons of aristocrats (i.e. holders of hereditary titles), 4 were sons of landed gentry while the rest came from various middle class backgrounds. Nine Scots, just under one-fourth, held seats in the Commons].

In theory, of course, all final decisions regarding appointments lay with the Crown, and occasionally the Monarch, either on the advice of a leading minister such as Walpole or Newcastle, or on his own initiative, determined nominations to certain of the more important posts abroad (viz. the embassy to Paris or Madrid). As a rule, however, under the Hanoverians as under Queen Anne, appointments were the resultant of a triangle of forces, varying in strength according to personalities, political exigencies, the needs of patronage and also the nature of the appointment in question. Usually there would be some deliberation between the King, the First Lord of the Treasury and the two Secretaries of State who by virtue of their office, necessarily came to exercise considerable control over appointments and particularly in their own departments. Thus A. Mitchell, for instance, owed his initial selection as minister to Prussia to the influence of Lord Holdernesse, then Secretary of State for the Northern Department; Lord Hyndford's mission to Berlin in 1741 was partly due to his friendship with Harrington; Sir Robert Murray Keith obtained his first post at Saxony on the recommendation of Gen. Seymour Conway, his former commanding officer during the Seven Years War, while Hugh Elliot in 1774, was "admitted to the foreign minister line by Lord Suffolk." Again it is suggestive and undoubtedly significant that both Mitchell and Keith were M.P.'s, Hyndford was a peer and Elliot the son of an influential politician, Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto. In each case there was the required political pull.

For Scots of humbler origin, on the other hand, with no powerful patron, the road to success was neither so straight nor the prospects so certain. Some began their diplomatic careers by acting as private clerks or secretaries to an established diplomatist, thereby gaining training and experience, in the hope of eventually moving upwards as they proved themselves and as opportunities arose. Joseph Ewart, for example, served first as unpaid clerk to R.M. Keith at Vienna, then in a similar capacity under Sir John Stepney at Berlin before, upon the latter's departure in 1784, he was promoted to charge d'affaires, subsequently to Secretary of legation (1785-8) and ultimately to Envoy extraordinary. So also began the career of Sir Joseph Liston, an Edinburgh scholar who entered the service in 1774, as private secretary to his former pupil Hugh Elliot then Minister at the Imperial Diet in Ratisbon. Nine years later, Liston was appointed Secretary of Embassy and minister plenipotentiary at Madrid, and eventually served as an ambassador at numerous capitals including Washington until his retirement in 1821. Similarly, Daniel Hailes started as Secretary of Embassy in 1784, advanced to Minister plenipotentiary and in due course became Envoy Extraordinary to Poland. Others had briefer careers, like William Fullarton who served as Secretary of Embassy for a few months but then left the service to become a distinguished soldier and later a writer of note, or, much the same, William Lindsay, who was Secretary of Legation in Russia from 1788-91, for a short time in 1791 attache at Berlin, and then became Governor of Tobago. Altogether between 1714-1789, something like 12 out of 40 Scottish diplomatists — over one fourth — appear to have started out as embassy secretaries, though, in the event only a small proportion ever graduated to higher ranks or achieved independent missions. The remainder either continued as secretaries, entered the army, returned to private life or in one case secured a position as Consul.

If key appointments were normally influenced by the prevailing system of court and ministerial patronage, only rarely were they made to the total exclusion of another criterion — the good of the Service. Even appointments to the minor posts, secretary of embassy or charge d'affaires, were often decided on this basis, all of which suggests that merit, while perhaps not a primary determinant, was at least a contributory factor in the selection process. It also points to one of the strongest reasons for the extraordinary success of the Scots — namely the fact that, in general, they were good men at the job. Unlike many of their English competitors, the Scots not only took their appointments seriously — regarded diplomacy as a steady profession, but also, a further selling point were quite willing to go to distant courts such as Poland, Russia or Turkey — places with climates and
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customs which the average Englishman found highly repugnant and
would visit only as a last resort. Moreover, the Scots, as a body,
possessed a ready facility in foreign languages — of decided advantage
in a profession where such ability, however desirable, was uncommon.

Probably one reason for this linguistic superiority was that a
large number of the Scots serving abroad, had either attended or
graduated from the University of Edinburgh where at this time, the
curriculum was broadly based, habits of industry were promoted and
where the intensive study of history and language was actively
encouraged. According to one well informed contemporary, Capt. E.
Topham, who spent 6 months at Edinburgh in 1774:

"...there are few places where a polite education can be better
acquired than in this city and where knowledge requisite to form
a gentleman and a man of the world can be sooner obtained. It is
one of the greatest faults of our (English) universities that so
much attention and importance should be given to studies which
perhaps are of little use to a man in life... here it is otherwise....
Besides the modern languages, music, painting, fencing, riding
and dancing are all taught here in some degree of perfection....
The Scotch are more fond of fencing than riding and in general
excel in it. But their greatest talent seems to be in acquiring
the knowledge of and speaking foreign languages, which they do with
much greater facility than our countrymen."76

Few English diplomatists throughout this period mastered more than
one foreign language — normally French — which being then the
medium of diplomacy was essential for a prospective envoy. Quite
often, however, — particularly in East European courts — situations
would arise calling for a knowledge of Russian or more often,
German77, whereupon the average British minister had no choice but
to rely on native secretaries or interpreters, sometimes with
unfortunate results.

Yet compare this with Sir Robert Murray Keith, who,
according to his biographer "possessed great conversational powers,
speaking French, Dutch, German and Italian well and having
a fluent command of Latin of which he made very good use in
diplomacy."78 Or likewise, Sir Robert Liston, who apparently "was
capable of speaking with comparative ease and correctness 10
different languages,"79 or again, Sir Joseph Ewart... "whose situation
was the consequence of great progress in education, with knowledge
also of languages."80

No doubt all the Scots who had either travelled or studied abroad
(at Leiden or Utrecht) — among them James Johnston, the Earl of
Stair, James Haldane, A. Mitchell, Alexander Cunningham and Sir
William Gordon — managed to acquire some German81 and Dutch, in
addition to French, while a few could even claim a working knowledge
of Spanish, Italian, Danish and Swedish. Thus Col. Robert Campbell,
sent as special envoy to Sweden in 1756, owed his appointment largely
to his acquaintance with Swedish politics and knowledge of the
language, he having been born of Scottish parents in the English
quarter of Stockholm just as Sir James Gray's command of Spanish
must have helped him secure the embassy to Madrid in 1767.82

What, finally, were the rewards, financial or otherwise, the Scots
could expect to obtain for their services? First, of course, there was the
regular salary, the so-called "ordinaries" paid according to ones level in
the service hierarchy. This comprised six grades in descending order:

a) Ambassador, ordinary or extraordinary, with or without the
title of plenipotentiary, £100 or less frequently £10 a day.
b) Envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary £8 a day.
c) Envoy extraordinary £5 a day.
d) Minister £4 a day.
e) Resident £3 a day.
f) Secretary of embassy £2 a day.83

In addition to these sums, during the time of their mission, most
ministers received a regular "extra-ordinary" allowance to cover such
expenses as postage, intelligence and stationery. This again varied not
only according to rank but to the court to which they were accredited.
Further amounts, also classified as extraordinaries were paid for
equipage, entertainment, travel on business and where necessary for
presents to foreign sovereigns and influential ministers. These could
range anywhere from 2000 per annum for an ambassador in the
higher class (i.e. posted to France, Spain or Austria) to about 200-250
for an envoy or resident at a lesser court.84 (As a rule, foreign
ministers had to first meet expenses from their own funds and then
try to secure reimbursement from the treasury — a vexatious and
invariably protracted process.)
Besides salaries and allowances, there were often perquisites of considerable value. Ambassadors, for instance, were entitled to a large quantity of white and gilt plate which, though ostensibly on loan, was frequently retained at the end of the mission.\(^8\) While diplomats of all ranks enjoyed (and sometimes abused) the privilege of exemption from customs duties on certain household goods, wearing apparel and on such luxury items as imported wine, rare paintings and books. Also, if a diplomat successfully negotiated a treaty he could expect a valuable present from the parties involved. Thus, Lord Hyndford, for his share in the Treaty of Breslau received from Frederick the Great a cash gift of 1000 crowns, from Maria Theresa her portrait set in diamonds and from his own government the Order of the Thistle.\(^9\) Sir Robert Sutton, ambassador at Constantinople, who had helped to settle Russo-Turkish differences in 1712 received 6000 ducats, a sable coat from the Russian negotiator as well as presents from the Czar.\(^8\) At some courts a valuable present was granted by the sovereign at a minister's departure. Thus, Frederick despite his grudge against Britain after the Seven Years War, presented to A. Mitchell a snuffbox with his portrait set in diamonds worth 3000 thalers\(^8\) while Stormont received a costly set of Sevres porcelain at the end of his mission to France.

Though service was not actually pensionable, there were usually some diplomats who, as a mark of royal favour obtained pensions from Civil list revenues\(^9\) and certainly under George III it became routine practise to grant retiring allowances to ex-ministers with records of long and distinguished service abroad. For example, John Murray who had been resident at Venice from 1754 to 1766 and then ambassador to Constantinople was given a pension of 1000 per annum, Sir James Porter after 23 years service received a pension of 1200 as did others, such as Sir Robert Ainslie, Robert Keith, Sir William Hamilton and Robert Liston (to name only a few).

Against these revenues, large as they seem, we must however balance the costs incurred in representing the crown abroad — costs which were always considerable and all too often exceeded income. Sometimes this was due to personal extravagance; as a rule, capital shortage was the result of two factors: unavoidably high operating expenses and frequent Treasury delays in paying salaries and extraordinaries. Not until the 19th century was any arrangement made to allow diplomats to draw in advance, month by month, sufficient funds to provide for the bulk of their extraordinary expenditures. Until then ministers if hard pressed had either to obtain short term loans on high interest or draw on what ever personal resources they had, in the hope of securing reimbursement later. Obviously the delays and financial uncertainties implicit in such a system were not calculated to stimulate zeal, encourage efficiency or to make the foreign service more attractive to those with alternative career prospects at home. Still, most Scots, by nature and habit strictly economical were usually able to remain solvent while abroad and even to live quite comfortably once they retired.

With the odd exception, there is little evidence that a stint in the diplomatic service directly determined the course of a man's later career, still less that (as with many Englishmen) it necessarily led to a profitable job at home. John, second Duke of Argyll would have wielded undisputed political power in Scotland regardless of his earlier appointment as ambassador to Spain. Similarly, James Stewart Mackenzie, who returned from Turin in 1761 and for a while administered the whole of Scottish patronage owed this position not to his Turin embassy but to his close relationship to Bute.\(^10\) And Lord Cathcart, though he was prominent in Scottish affairs after his return from Russia and held the office of Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly until his death, he had occupied that same office before his entry into diplomacy. Even Lord Hyndford, who enjoyed vast prestige after his missions to Russia and Vienna, occupied only minor domestic posts, preferring instead to spend his later life in the improvement and enlargement of his estates. Probably the only Scottish nobleman who attained high office as a result of his diplomatic career was Viscount Stormont, later second Earl of Mansfield who became Secretary of State for the Northern Department (1779-82) was Lord President of the Council in 1783 and again from 1794-1796.\(^11\)

Much the same applies to the diplomats of middle class background some of whom like James Haldane and William Fullerton, after several diplomatic missions, returned to a career in the army, like H. Elliot transferred to the Colonial Service or like Robert Keith, Joseph Ewart and William Lindsay retired on a pension. Several others, notably Andrew Mitchell, and Thomas Crawfurd died at their posts.

Space and time precludes a detailed study of the actual
negotiations conducted by the Scots, but from what has been said some concluding observations may be made. First, with regard to the broader political picture after 1707, it is clear that Scottish admission into the foreign service was seen by many Scots as but one example of the opportunities inherent in the Union, and so in effect helped to make the Union more acceptable—especially among the upper and middle classes. Enjoying by mid-century increasing wealth and confidence, peers, country gentlemen as well as professionals, began to realize that the Union, however imperfect, still offered much wider scope for the exercise of their talents than would have been possible in an independent Scotland.

At the same time, despite the continuation of national animosities, both Englishmen and Scots, through close association in a common cause, gradually learned to tolerate, understand and, if grudgingly, to respect each other—another significant reason why the Union settlement managed to survive.

More obviously, the diplomatic corps offered an attractive alternative to military venture, as an outlet for Scottish ambitions and energies and equally it enhanced Scottish national pride and self-consciousness to have their natives play such vital and distinguished roles in the diplomatic capitals of Europe. This in turn encouraged those who, certain of Scotland’s potential, hoped to redefine the Union in such a manner that Scotland would eventually be elevated from her subordinate position to a full and equal partnership with her southern partner.

As for England, she reaped the advantage of having the services of eager, ambitious and on the whole hardworking careerists, men with a natural penchant for the arts of diplomacy whose expertise and technical efficiency was at all times vital to the Nation’s prestige and security. In an age of amateurism and oligarchy, when rank, influence and wealth all too often took precedence over merit, when abroad Britain’s interests were frequently represented by novice aristocrats or shifty adventurers intent only on their own profits the Scots, by contrast and example, acquired a name for ability and diligence thus standing as forerunners of the growing professionalism in diplomacy which was to become really prominent only towards the end of the 18th century.

**APPENDIX**

*A list of Scottish Diplomats and their ranks, 1714-1789. (in alphabetical order)*

Ainsley, Sir Robert, Ambassador, 1775-1793 (Turkey).
Burnet, Alexander, Secretary, 1756-1764, Charge d’Affaires, 1764-1766. Secretary, 1766-1771, Charge d’Affaires, 1771-1772 (Prussia).
Campbell, Alexander, Lord Polwarth, Envoy-extraordinary, 1716-20 (Denmark), Ambassador-extraordinary, 1720-21. Also appointed Envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Prussia, 1716, but did not go.
Campbell, John, Baron Glenorchy, 3rd. Earl of Breadalane. Envoy-extraordinary 1720-1731 (Denmark).
Campbell, Robert, Lt. Col., Minister Resident, 1757 (Sweden).
Carmichael, John, Earl of Hyndford, Envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary 1741-4 (Prussia), Minister plenipotentiary 1744-5 (Russia). Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary 1745-9 (Russia). 1752, Special mission to Vienna, no separate rank.
Cathcart, Charles, Baron, Ambassador extraordinary, 1768-1772 (Russia).
Crawford, Thomas, Secretary of Embassy, 1715-20 (France). Resident, 1722-4.
Cunningham, Alexander, Resident, 1715-1719 (Venice).
Dalrymple, John (later 6th Earl of Stair), Minister plenipotentiary, 1782-4 (Poland). Envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, 1785-7 (Prussia). Mission with Sir Isaac Head, Garter King-at-arms to invest the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel with the Order of the Garter, 1786. No special rank.
Daniel, Robert, Charge d’affaires, 1722-45 (Flanders).
Erskine, David Stuart, Lord Cardross (later Earl of Buchan), Secretary of Embassy, 1766 (Spain).
Mackenzie, James Stewart, Envoy extraordinary, 1758-60. Envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, 1760-61 (Sardinia).

Mitchell, Andrew, Minister, 1756-60. Envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, 1766-71 (Prussia).

Murray, John, Resident, 1754-66 (Venice). Ambassador, 1766-75 (Turkey).

Ross, Gen. Charles, Envoy Extraordinary, 1714 (France).


Stuart, John (Baron Cardiff), Envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, 1779-83 (Sardinia). Appointed Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Spain 1783, but never went.

1 On the haphazard structure and organization of the service at this time see: D.B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service 1689-1789 (Oxford, 1961), 12-11.


Quoted in Horn, Diplomatic Service, 88. Compare this with the earlier reaction of Lord Dartmouth, who, upon being told of Queen Anne's despatch to post him to Venice, replied: "If the Queen thought it for her service that I should be out of the way I need not go so far, having a house in Staffordshire that I could easily and willingly retire to." Burant, History of My Own Time, (Oxford, 1823) V., 140.


Lord Auckland, Journal and Correspondence, (London, 1861), I. 430.

On the order of rank and emoluments in the service at this time see: D.B. Horn "The Cost of the Diplomatic Service 1747-52", English Historical Review, 1928, 606-611; and idem, British Diplomatic Service, Ch. III.

A well known example being the passage granted to Harrington for returning to Spain to conclude the Treaty of Seville in 1729. Another envoy, George Pitt, after some years of service at the court of Turin, also demanded a passage as the price for his return to his post, but was refused. Similar instances could be cited indefinitely. See: B. Williams, "The Foreign Office Under the First Two Georges", Blackwood's Magazine, 1907, 96. J. Forresq ed., The Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760 to December 1780. (London, 1827), I, 180-194.

Thus, for instance, William Bentinck, William III's Dutch favourite conducted the peace negotiations with France in 1697, Henri de Massue de Rivugny, earl of Galway served from 1693-1696 as envoy to Piedmont while Philibert de Haveron, another Huguenot emigre served as minister to Geneva and later went to the Swiss Cantons cf. Henri Van der Zee, William and Mary, (1782), 438-446. D. Ogg, England in the Reign of James II and William III. (Oxford, 1966), 437, 446. Schaaf and S. Saphorin, for many years the British representatives at Vienna were both natives of Switzerland cf. A. Ward, Great Britain and Hanover (Oxford, 1899). 49. A. Latt, "Zwei Schweizer Diplomaten im Dienste Grossbritanniens" Basler Zeitschrift fur Geschichte und Altertumswissenschaft, (Basel, 1925) VD XXI.


Alexander Hume Campbell, Afterwards 2nd. Earl of Marchmont. In 1722, he was also British Delegate to the Congress of Cambrai. See: B.D.R. 3, D.N.B., III, 760.


THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

44 Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia, 150.
46 Smyth, op. cit., 95 ff.
47 Observations on the Kingdom of Naples (1774), Observations on Mt. Vesuvius, Mt. Etna and other Volcanoes (1772); Collection of Engravings from Ancient Views (vol. 5).
48 D.N.B., I, 189-190.
51 A. Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh (London, 1884), II, 489.
54 In a letter to the Public Advertiser, 30 March 1773, quoted in Horn, Diplomatic Service, 119.
58 Such as the case of his nephew David Murray, Viscount Stormont.
59 Horn, Diplomatic Service, 120.
60 These calculations are based on Sir Lewis Namier and J. Brooke (eds.), The House of Commons 1754-1790 (London, 1964) II, III, Burke's Landed Gentry, Douglas, Scottish Peerage and B.D.R.
61 These were usually secured by Noblemen, politicians or court favourites, mostly men without prior diplomatic experience.
62 As Grenville, prime minister from 1763-65, put it: "The Secretary of State ought to have the appointment of the Ministers in his department because he is answerable for their dispatches and ought to give them their instructions" W.J. Smith (ed.), The

63 Lodge, Britain and Prussia, 88. Doran, op. cit., 4-5.
64 William Stanhope, 1st Lord Harrington, Secretary of State (North), 16 May 1730-12 Feb. 1742; 24 Nov. 1744; 19 Oct. 1746.
66 Henry Howard, 12th Earl of Suffolk, Secretary of State (North) 12 June 1771-6 March 1779.
69 Countess of Minto, A Memoir of the Right Honourable Hugh Elliot (Edinburgh, 1868), 104-105; A Grant, op. cit., II, 489.
70 B.D.R., 26, 95.
71 Namier and Brooke, The Commons, 1754-1790, II, 475-576; Horn, Diplomatic Service, 298.
72 Horn, "Edinburgh University and the Diplomatic Service", 31.
73 Thus Sir Charles Hanbury Williams was selected in 1755 for the Russian embassy not principally because of his political connections but because he was thought to be personally acceptable to the Czarina, and therefore in a better position to discharge his mission. Equally, in 1767, we find Sir James Gray being sent to Madrid, partly by reason of his training and experience but even more because he has already gained the goodwill of Charles III during an earlier mission to Naples.
74 D.B. Horn, "Edinburgh University and the Diplomatic Service", passage.
76 At the Russian court, wrote Lord Hyndford, "German was a thing absolutely essential" Later again: "I have been obliged lately to accept all the papers from this court in the German language, although I gave mine in French, for they have but one person who is at the same time their decipherer who is capable of translating from the Russian into French" See: Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva, vol. 105, 183, 211-212. Naturally, German was also used, alongside with French, at the various German courts and in Austria. A knowledge of Italian was useful at Constantinople as well as in the Barbary States where it frequently served as an official language. See: A.N. Curtiss, The Dispatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople, 1770-1714 (London, 1953), 112-13, 183.
78 Countess of Minto, A Memoir, 104-5. A. Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh (London, 1884), II, 489.
79 Quoted in Horn, Scottish Diplomats, 14-15.
80 As did those, like R.M. Keith, and Lord Cathcart who as officers had been stationed with their regiments in Germany during the Seven Years War.
81 Sir J. Gray to Shelburne, Nov. 14, 1766. PRO, SPF, 94/175.
The Social Context of Scottish Marriages in Nova Scotia

INTRODUCTION: If the "wolf" is at the door, it is not likely that there will be arguments in the house about whose turn it is to wash the dishes. In various settings, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that a "we-they" confrontation is established, whether it be contrived or evolved, cleavages within the two entities (i.e., within the "we" and the "they") are submerged or muted in the face of the common enemy. Georg Simmel has been credited with this generalization. But leaders throughout history have been sensitive to this rule and some have employed it to great effect in maintaining their leadership. Research in family studies as well have shown that in times of crisis such as economic depressions, wars, death or illness in the family, not infrequently the members have worked together in greater harmony than they did either before or after the crisis. Other examples from the literature could be cited.

Looked at in its simplest terms, Canada has survived through the employment of a two-level "we-they" model. Vis-à-vis the United States, Canada has been the poor relative attempting to resist the warm embrace of her wealthy but domineering aunt. Within Canad's borders, the French have worked hard to maintain themselves against the English.

Given this "we-they" structure, there seems to have been a concerted effort, over an extended period of time, to homogenize the differences within the two major language entities. The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Royal Commission is a case in point. It was established to investigate the state of the "we-they" model primarily...