By the opening of the sixteenth century the conditions which had made the Franco-Scottish alliance effective had vanished. England was comparatively free of continental entanglements and had emerged from the Wars of the Roses as a united monarchy under a strong dynasty. Moreover, the French invasions of Italy and the subsequent Hapsburg-Valois struggle made France a less valuable and a less reliable friend, as the frequent shifts in the continental balance of power might at any moment make France an ally of England. Consequently, after 1500, the strength of Tudor England, along with the changed situation on the continent, presented the Scots with a strong case for the adoption of a more friendly policy towards England.

It is not surprising, then, that the early years of the sixteenth century saw the emergence of a party (1) seeking an accommodation with England, of a party which sought to secure Scottish independence by an alliance with England. Yet no historian, whether of the sixteenth century or later, has traced the fortunes of the English party, and its role in Anglo-Scottish relations has attracted little research. (2) The party, when it is mentioned at all, is usually dismissed as a faction of collaborators who were prepared to accept Scottish subordination to English interests in return for financial aid from England, or referred to as a "Protestant" party, implying that it was a "Child of the Reformation". (3) But this party which emerged more than a generation before the Reformation was, as I shall suggest, led and supported by patriotic Scots seeking to come to terms with a powerful neighbour—England whom they could no longer effectively oppose by co-operation with a distant ally—France.

While the external forces making for an Anglo-Scottish alliance were the most obvious and pressing, there were also a number of internal forces within Scottish society pushing in this direction. Among these, although by no means the most important, was the emergence of an economically influential and politically significant "middle class"—the merchants who were interested in securing peace with England as a means of protecting their trade routes and thereby increasing their prosperity. (4) Of much greater importance were the chaotic conditions within the Scottish church which led to the appearance of reforming opinions among the Scots who eventually looked to Henry VIII as their protector. (5) There was also the increasing cultural influence of England which by degrees was bringing to the Scottish Lowlands the language and mores of the southern kingdom. (6)

Yet if the forces of geography and history made for closer relations with England, they also imposed divisions on the Scots which could not easily be
overcome by the relatively weak Scottish monarchy. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the Scots could not agree on a policy towards their southern neighbour. After 1500, the case for abandoning the “Auld Alliance” was strong. But it was certainly debatable and the opposition to change was sustained by lingering and well founded suspicions of English intentions.

During the first decade of the sixteenth century, however, the argument for a more favourable attitude towards England was strengthened by the policy of Henry VII. In 1492 the king compromised English claims upon France by accepting a pension, and in 1502 he concluded a perpetual peace with Scotland, giving his daughter Margaret in marriage to James IV. This wedding gave Scotland a connection with the English line of succession, which was not implemented until Elizabeth I died childless in 1603. But the hopes for improved Anglo-Scottish relations which the treaty inspired were soon destroyed by the aggressive policy of Henry VIII, who was, far more than James IV, responsible for the battle of Flodden (1513). Thereafter, the English King’s treatment of Scotland varied according to the state of Anglo-French relations which, in turn, were influenced by the contemporary Hapsburg-Valois struggle and Henry’s need for French support for his repudiation of Catherine of Aragon. (7)

The almost continual warfare with England affected adversely every aspect of Scottish life. It hindered both the maintenance of law and order as well as the administration of the government. In 1513 James IV’s death at Flodden plunged the nation into the turbulent minority of James V. Twenty-nine years later, James V’s collapse and decease after the battle of Solway Moss placed the government in the hands of the facile regent, the earl of Arran. (8) The wars also retarded the economic development of the country. Some of Scotland’s most fertile lands, her wealthiest abbeys and monasteries, and even her most important towns were destroyed during the English invasions. Scottish commerce likewise felt their disastrous effects, for these wars made internal communication more difficult and left the most important route for sea trade along the east coast of England at the mercy of the enemy. (9)

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in the early sixteenth century Scots were beginning to question more and more the wisdom of the traditional policy of friendship with France. The idea of an alliance with England appears to have emerged at the time of the marriage union of 1503 - the sacrament which united Margaret Tudor and James IV. This event marked the appearance of a very small number among the Scottish nobles who favoured an understanding with England. (10) Two of these men, Bishop William Elphinstone of Aberdeen and Archibald Douglas, fifth earl of Angus, (11) vainly warned James IV against declaring war on Henry VIII on behalf of Louis XII of France in 1513. (12)

Yet it took the shock of Flodden to bring into being an English party centred on the Douglas interests and connections. The object of the anglophiles was not to secure the subordination of Scotland to English policy, but an alliance of England and Scotland as equals. This party enjoyed a brief period in power when its leader, Archibald Douglas, sixth earl of Angus, (13) married Queen Margaret in 1514. Contrary to the opinion of most British historians, there was more involved there than a mere triumph of the Douglasses, because the party
immediately sought an English alliance and sought it consistently in the next few months. (14) The failure of the anglophiles to secure a satisfactory alliance with England, together with the opposition aroused by the Tudor - Douglas combination, provided sufficient reasons for their enemies to challenge Margaret's position as regent and to insist on the heir presumptive John Stewart, duke of Albany, a firm adherent of the French interests, (15) taking control of the regency. (16) As Henry was unable to send any effective aid to the anglophiles without violating the terms of the Anglo-French treaty (August 1514), his efforts on their behalf were confined to an ineffectual attempt to persuade Margaret and her relatives to take refuge in England and the French king to keep Albany in France. Left without English support the anglophiles were driven from power on the coming of Albany to Scotland in May 1516. (17) During the next nine years the "French" duke exercised a precarious control over the regency. He was confronted with many of the same problems which had faced the anglophiles, that is the weakness of the monarchy under a regency and the inclination of the Scots to oppose the policies of any party in power. In the end his attempts to rally the Scots to the "Auld Alliance" in 1522-23 aroused so much opposition among them that he left Scotland in 1524, never to return. (18)

It was in that same year that the English party regained power. At this time the leadership of the party and the effective control of the Scottish government was in the hands of Queen Margaret and the earl of Arran. (19) In their efforts to pursue a pro-English policy, Margaret and Arran faced formidable difficulties in seeking to guide the state between the hostile francophiles who refused to renounce the "Auld Alliance" and the powerful English government which soon made it clear that it had no intention of concluding an alliance of equals with Scotland. (20) To these difficulties were added Margaret's unpredictable personal conduct which soon created a serious division within the English party. It became obvious, therefore, to many of her followers that it was impossible for them to remain in power without the powerful head of the Douglas family, Angus. (21) When Margaret and Arran failed in their attempts to prevent the pro-English earl's return from exile in England, they became involved with him in a struggle for the leadership of the English party which brought the realm to the brink of civil war. (22) Such were the events which most British historians have viewed simply in terms of a personality conflict between Margaret and Angus instead of a clash within the party between the Douglas interests and the Queen mother's supporters.

By 1525 the leadership of the English party had passed to Angus who became the dominant influence in the Scottish state between 1526-8. Contrary to what has been frequently assumed by British historians, Angus was not an agent who worked to bring about the subordination of Scotland to English policy. His object was to secure a peace and alliance with England with the comprehension of France. Towards this end he sought to hold the balance between the French party in Scotland and Henry VIII, negotiating with his internal enemies and his prospective external ally at the same time. (23) This policy collapsed in 1528 when King James escaped from Angus's custody and sought to rule with the aid of the French party. The earl could have survived only by massive aid from Henry, but when his appeals were not answered he was forced to flee once again across the Border into England. (24)
Indeed, the king of England had little reason to regret the fall of Angus, because young King James V immediately offered him a five-year peace treaty without the restoration of the Douglasses, which he accepted. (25) From Henry's point of view there seemed to be little reason to make great sacrifices on behalf of the English party when the rival faction offered a satisfactory settlement. Yet the ascendency of the French party had its dangers, for Henry's northern frontier would only be secure as long as England and France remained at peace. Angus was consequently welcomed as a pensioned guest of the English court; he would be useful in the future if, as and when hostilities broke out between England and Scotland. (26)

Under these conditions, the English party in Scotland was able to survive only because James V insisted on negotiating with Emperor Charles V for an Imperial marriage alliance. (27) As this alliance was opposed by both the English and French parties, they were compelled to work together in opposition to James's policy, with the support and encouragement of the kings of England and France. (28) When James found the Imperial project unworkable, he returned to the policy of the anglophiles, securing a perpetual peace with England with the comprehension of France in May 1534. (29)

After 1534 the English party was strengthened by the growth of Protestantism in Scotland and the emergence of Henry VIII as the obvious "Protestant" champion. The reconstructed party, as it emerged in the late 1530's, was composed of a solid core of anglophiles who had been traditionally associated with Angus, along with a growing body of Protestant nobles, lairds and merchants. (30) Apart from a general desire to extend their influence at court and in the country, the anglophiles continued to seek a permanent peace and marriage alliance with England.

Notwithstanding the increased strength of the English party, the francophiles remained in power in Scotland during the next eight years, 1534-42. To counteract their influence Henry sent Lord William Howard and Dr. William Barlow, his chaplain, to turn James away from making "Scotland a French satellite or an imperial appanage". The English king hoped to accomplish this by conferring the Order of the Garter on his nephew (February 1535), persuading him to follow English ecclesiastical policy and above all encouraging Queen Margaret and the influential Protestant Scots at court to promote both the English religion and the cause of peace and amity between England and Scotland. (31) The efforts of Howard and Barlow were earnestly supported by the anglophiles, with the result that James, at last, agreed to meet Henry in 1536. (32) This gesture towards the anglophiles was sufficient to secure financial support from the clergy and moral support from France which was perhaps what the king wanted. (33) At any rate, instead of meeting Henry, the king set sail for France in the autumn of 1536 where he married Princess Madeleine, the daughter of Francis I, in January of the following year. (34) The death of the princess after a two-month residence in Scotland appeared to give the English party a new opportunity, but the French marriage alliance was renewed in June 1538 when James married Mary of Guise. (35)

By this time it was evident that the policy of Henry and the English party had failed. James's French marriage committed him to the Roman Catholic
confederacy of 1539 and a policy of war with England under circumstances in which his allies could not easily come to his assistance. (36) Thus Scotland was directly exposed to a possible English attack. These facts appear to have been fully understood by the anglophiles who correctly assumed that war would lead to another Flodden. For the next three years they were therefore, in effect, the peace party in Scotland, warning the Scots of the dangers of such a catastrophe. Their policy was to co-ordinate their peace efforts whenever possible with those of the English ambassador, Sir Ralph Sadler. (37) While James, who shared the fear of another Flodden, was always prepared to acknowledge the force of the anglophile arguments and agreed to meet Henry at York in 1541, the anglophiles had little more to offer than arguments, as an English marriage alliance was not a possibility. (38) Although the growing strength of Protestantism swelled the number of the anglophiles, it also tended to unite the clerical and French interests in opposition enabling the latter to draw on the considerable financial resources of the Scottish church. (39) As Henry was not prepared to offer substantial financial assistance to the English party and the principal anglophiles - Angus and his brother, Sir George Douglas of Pittendreich remained in exile, the party was left without effective leadership and sufficient funds.

In 1542 Henry, concluding that the English party was not likely to be effective, took military measures against Scotland which ended in a temporary defeat for the English at Haddenrig in August. (40) Immediately after this Scottish victory, James, encouraged by the anglophiles, attempted to open negotiations with Henry, but the peace talks broke down, partly because of the English King’s conviction that force was necessary, and partly because of the successful intervention of the French party. (41) In October 1542 James, disregarding anglophile pressure, made an attempt to invade England but found at Fala Muir that the barons would not follow him across the Border. (42) Confronted with this show of opposition, James decided to place himself in the hands of Beaton and the French party. This led directly to the catastrophe of Solway Moss and, in turn, to the death of James a few days later. (43)

In the beginning of 1543 the English party was strengthened by the homecoming of Sir George Douglas and the “assured anglophiles” led by Angus. The “assured anglophiles”, that is the “assured lords” or “English lords”, many of whom had long been associated with anglophile and Protestant reforming opinion, were paroles who had been captured at Solway Moss. (44) Since this catastrophe had fully vindicated the prophecies of the anglophiles, the governor, Arran, decided to support them. He was prepared to encourage the growth of Protestantism, to secure a marriage alliance with England and to keep Beaton and the French party out of power. (45) But as Henry regarded Scotland as a defeated country, he demanded the control of the regency, the marriage of Queen Mary Stewart and his son Prince Edward, the presence of the young queen in England and the possession of the key Scottish fortresses. (46)

It must be conceded that as things stood it was impossible to reconcile Henry’s demands with the programme of Angus and the English party, but as long as negotiations continued the anglophiles could remain in power. The first
serious threat to the anglophile ascendancy in Scotland was posed by the removal of Beaton from Dalkeith, a Douglas castle to St. Andrews, one of his own strongholds, and the intrigue of Mary of Guise, the pro-French queen mother, who informed the English court that she accepted both the proposed marriage alliance and the necessity of having the infant queen resident in England. (47) Henry’s confidence in the anglophiles was further undermined by the return of the earl of Lennox, Arran’s pro-French rival for the governorship, (48) to Scotland, with the renewed threat of the resurgence of the French party. (49) In the light of these events, Henry sought to impose his will through forcible language and reiteration of unacceptable demands, which drew Arran to consider a reversal of policy in April 1543. (50)

Yet the anglophiles succeeded in persuading Arran, the governor and guardian of the young queen, the essential intermediary through whom they worked, for the time being to maintain his appearance of support of them. The details of Arran’s manoeuvres are admittedly obscure, but the reasons for his decision are clear enough. He realized how much his position rested on the support of the English party, especially since his rival, Lennox, had refused to recognize him as governor, and he feared that a break with Henry would result in another disastrous war with England. (51) Accordingly he took measures against the francophiles and continued negotiations with Henry, who modified his demands to permit the residence of Mary Stewart in Scotland until the age of eight, or ten at the latest, but refused to allow her to marry Edward until she reached the age of twelve or to consider an alliance with Scotland which comprehended France. (52) Although these terms were still unacceptable to Arran and the anglophiles, time was working in their favour. In June their hopes were raised when the threat of war with France induced Henry to accept a peace and a marriage alliance with Scotland which permitted the comprehension of France, the retention of Queen Mary in Scotland until the age of ten and her marriage by proxy before leaving the country. (53)

With the signing of these Greenwich treaties in July 1543, the anglophiles had achieved their objective, an alliance of equals. The difficulty was that Arran could not secure the general acceptance of the treaties among the Scots. (54) And when he requested substantial English financial aid to strengthen his position against the francophile opponents of the treaties, Henry was faced with the apparent choice of supporting the English party in power in order to secure the treaties which he regarded as unsatisfactory, or disregarding the treaties and using force to secure a more satisfactory settlement. Henry chose the second policy. (55) This decision led the regent to reverse his policy, and this reversal was, in turn, followed by the “Rough Wooing” by which Henry VIII punished the Scots for the renunciation of the Treaties of Greenwich, and also rendered Scotland incapable of participating in the current Anglo-French war. (56)

This devastating invasion was fatal to the English party. Its members soon split into two wings, one which consisted of the moderate majority centered on Angus and a minority led by Lennox which was inclined to collaborate with the English on Henry’s terms. Unlike the Lennox faction, Angus and the majority of the anglophiles fought valiantly against the English at Ancrum Moor (Feb. 1545) and at Pinkie (September 1547), rallying to the side of the government.
when Scottish independence seemed to be in the balance. (57) This was quite in keeping with the previous actions of Angus and the moderate majority who had always sought an Anglo-Scottish alliance of equals, but who, whenever Henry’s policy posed a threat to Scottish independence, had resisted his advances. For they represented that substantial section of Scottish society, for which the English alliance was primarily a means of securing the independence and prosperity of Scotland, and only incidentally a means of sustaining itself in power.

The weakness of the anglophiles had always been that they had too little to offer. While they could accept a marriage alliance which provided for the ultimate union of the crowns of England and Scotland, they would not guarantee Scottish subordination to English policy in the immediate future. Their insistence on the comprehension of France in any treaty with England made it clear that they were either unable or unwilling to offer more than benevolent neutrality. Yet this could not be offered with confidence as the hold of the anglophiles on the regency, even during their periods of ascendancy, remained precarious. Men of the ability of the Beatons, who usually had at their disposal French assistance and, after 1534, the considerable resources of the church, could always exploit the inherent divisions among the Scots in such a way as to frustrate the policies of the anglophiles.

Henry VIII never found the offers of the anglophiles attractive, and wavered between making an effort to reduce Scotland to a client kingdom and signing a treaty based on the proposals of the English party in the hope that once given such a treaty the anglophiles could maintain their position in power without substantial aid. The conclusion of the Treaties of Greenwich marked the somewhat reluctant acceptance by Henry of the latter policy. But when it became clear that the anglophiles needed continuous financial support to maintain themselves in power, Henry, abandoning this policy, decided to reduce Scotland to obedience by force.

Although this policy was disastrous for the anglophiles and for Anglo-Scottish relations, it was a comprehensible policy from an English point of view. After three decades of effort to untangle the complex web of Scottish politics, Henry lost patience and attempted to cut the Gordian knot. Neither Henry, the francophiles, nor the anglophiles were prepared to recognize the weaknesses of their position. Henry wanted to impose a policy on Scotland which was beyond his strength, the francophiles were clinging to an alliance which committed Scotland to wars with England and which could end in defeat, and the anglophiles expected to be sustained by England without accepting subordination to English foreign policy. The survival of the anglophiles as a powerful Scottish party depended upon the hopes which they could arouse among the Scots of securing a favourable settlement with England. Once Henry’s policy made it clear that such terms could not be secured, the English party disintegrated.

It is necessary to emphasize at this point that the English party, which emerged shortly after Flodden, was at no time prepared to become the agent of English policy. The power of the party was built around the Douglas interests and connections, but its support had a relatively broad socio-economic base,
which included not only nobles but also lairds and burgesses. Although it received support from Protestants after 1534, it never became an entirely Protestant party because its leader, Angus, and many of its supporters remained Roman Catholics.

The members of the English party were attracted to it for a variety of reasons. Initially there was simply a loss of faith in the "Auld Alliance", a feeling which was soon strengthened by the conviction that the long-term interests of Scotland lay in a close association with England. As many of those reaching this conclusion were nobles, who, under any circumstances, would seek to control the great offices of state, their anglophile sympathies were often blended with a desire to exercise power. The merchants who supported the party were concerned with the security of the Scottish trade routes and the prospects of the English market. Finally, there were the Protestants who needed the protection of a powerful political group, and naturally sought it from the party which favoured an alliance with a "Protestant" king - Henry VIII. Apart from this, there were motives of individuals at all levels of society who acted from a variety of reasons such as dislike of the French party, political adventurism, family connections, tenant loyalties and hope of financial gain. (58)

Although the English party disintegrated, it played an important part in Scottish history. One of its most lasting effects emerged from its alliance with the Protestant element in Scotland in which it challenged the ecclesiastical establishment. The anglophiles provided protection for a religious movement which was relatively weak. Yet under their aegis Scottish Protestants gained sufficient strength by 1550 to stand alone, and by 1557 to organize "The Lords of the Congregation of Jesus Christ," the military arm of the reformation.

The continuous existence of the English party between 1513 and 1544 posed a challenge to the traditional foreign policy of Scotland. Throughout these years Scottish foreign policy wavered between efforts to maintain the "Auld Alliance" and attempts to secure a satisfactory accommodation with England, for which the anglophiles deserve the credit of offering a concrete proposal in 1543. This policy was far-sighted, for it was presented at a time when the religious, political and economic forces were making the idea of an Anglo-Scottish union more acceptable to the Scots. By this move the anglophiles took a further step in the dissolution of the "Auld Alliance" and in a rapprochement with England, which came to fuller expression during the Reformation of the 1560's and which helped, although in a small way, to bring about the eventual union of the crowns of England and Scotland.

1. The term "party" is used here in the early sixteenth century context of the word to refer to a group of families held together by a policy or idea, which might also attract support from commercial interests, religious bodies and individuals.
2. The English party receives little attention, for example, in such general Scottish works as John Pinkerton's History of Scotland from the Accession of the House of Stuart to that of Mary (London, 1797), W. Croft Dickinson's Scotland from the earliest times to 1603 (London, 1961), Gordon Donaldson's Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh, 1965) and J.D. Mackie's A History
3. See, for example, P.F. Tytler, History of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1864), II, 295 ff; J.H. Burton, The History of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1867), III, 1 ff; Andrew Lang, A History of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1900), I, 392 ff.
8. James, 2nd earl of Arran, son of James (earl of Arran) and his second wife, Janet Beaton; he married Margaret, eldest daughter of James Douglas, 3rd earl of Morton; he died at Hamilton on 22 January 1575 (Scotts Peerage, Sir J. Balfour Paul ed. (Edinburgh, 1904), IV, 386-70).
11. Archibald (Bell the Cat), 5th earl of Angus, eldest son of George (earl of Angus) and Isabella, only daughter of Sir John Sibbald of Balcony; he died towards the end of 1513, or a little later (Scotts Peerage, I, 178-86).
13. Archibald Douglas, 6th earl of Angus, eldest son of George, master of Angus, and Elizabeth Drummond, grandson of Archibald “Bell the Cat”, 5th earl of Angus (Scotts Peerage, I, 190-3).
15. John, 4th duke of Albany, son of Alexander (duke of Albany), the exiled brother of James III, and Anne de la Tour, third daughter of Bertrand, comte d’Auvergne and d’Bouillon, his father’s second wife; he married his cousin-german, Anne de la Tour, comtesse d’Auvergne and de Lauragais; he was therefore the French speaking cousin and heir of the infant, James V, following the death of the king’s brother, the duke of Ross, in 1515 (Scotts Peerage, I, 151-5).


19. James, 2nd Lord Hamilton, 1st earl of Arran, son of James (Lord of Cadzow and 1st Lord Hamilton), and Mary Stewart, sister of James III; he was therefore the native-born Scot nearest the throne; he married, first, Elizabeth, daughter of Alexander, 3rd Lord Home, and secondly, Janet Beaton, said to be the daughter of David Beaton of Creich; he died about 26 March 1529 (Scots Peerage, IV, 355-60).


21. St. P. Henry VIII, IV, 146-9; L. and P. IV (1), 651, 670 (ii), 672, 800, Pinkerton, op. cit., II, 243. So great was the dissatisfaction of Lennox, Kilmaurs, and their supporters that they even made an abortive attempt to capture James and Margaret and to murder Arran at Holyrood Palace (St. P. Henry VIII, IV, 188-90; L. and P., IV (1), 762).


23. Ibid., pp. 119 ff.


26. See Sir William Fraser, The Douglas Book (Edinburgh, 1885), II, 252-3 wherein it is stated that Angus was well received by Henry VIII who granted him a pension of 1000 marks yearly.


32. St. P. Henry VIII, V, 14-5, 20-1, 35, 42-3; 44-5; L. and P., VII, 1528-31, where these documents are wrongly placed in 1534 (see ibid., IX, 856-9); X, 421, 494; H.P. I, 28-30; Letters of James V, pp. 313, 316-7; D. Calderwood, The History of the Kirk of Scotland (Edinburgh, Wodrow Society, 1842), I, 146; Robert Lindsay of Pittscottie, The Historie and Chronicles of Scotland, A.G.J. Mackay, ed. (Edinburgh, Scottish Text Society, 1894), I, 340-1; L. Barbe, Kircaldy of Grange (Edinburgh, 1897), P. 12; Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII, p. 25.
38. B.M., Add. M.S., 32, 646, fol. 220; L. and P., XVI, 1034 (2), 1105, 1115-6, 1125, 1130, 1141, 1143, 1183, XVII, 88 (4); H.P.I, 82-5; Calderwood op. cit., I, 146; Barbe, op. cit., p. 12; Froude, op. cit., IV, 123-4; Lang, op. cit., 451; Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII, p. 59.
of Scotland, p. 140, Lang, op. cit., I, 453.
42. St. P. Henry VIII, V, 213-6, 221-2; L. and P., XVII, 1025, 1039, 1058, 1100, 1117; Pinkerton, op. cit., II, 381; Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII, pp. 26-7, 59.
47. L. and P., XVIII (1), 305, 313, 391, 395; H. P., I, 337; S.S.P., I, 65-90, 131-2, 136-7; The Scottish Correspondence of Mary of Lorraine, 1543-1560, Annie I. Cameron, ed. (Edinburgh, Scottish History Society, 1927, henceforth cited as Scottish Correspondence), pp. 5-7; Tytler, op. cit., IV, 98, Slavin, op. cit., pp. 111-3; Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII, p. 65.
48. Mathew, 4th earl of Lennox, son of John (earl of Lennox), grandson of Mathew (earl of Lennox) and Elizabeth, the daughter of James, Lord Hamilton, and Princess Mary, the daughter of King James II, was the next heir to the throne after Arran, and stood before him if the latter's legitimacy was successfully challenged (Scots Peerage, IV, 353-4).
51. Charteris, op. cit., p. 266.
57. L. and P., XXI, 289, 301, 311-3, 332, 339, 382; Scottish Correspondence, p. XXV; H. P., I, 419-20; Mackie, History of Scotland, pp. 143-44; Donaldson,
Scotland: James V to James VII, p. 71.