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A romantic view of arms and the man may also be discovered in Scott's tendency to celebrate the victories of irregular forces over those formally and permanently embodied. In Waverley it is Prestonpans, not Culloden, that attracts him. In Old Mortality we read of two battles. In the first the regulars are defeated by the saints of the Covenant; in the second the regulars defeat the saints. It is the first engagement that we remember and that draws the more emphatic tributary comment from Scott. And all readers of Ivanhoe know that Locksley's irregular foresters defeat de Bracy's mercenaries at Torquilstone.4

One must make the necessary qualifications. Sympathy for the underdog surely plays a role in Scott's presentation of these events, and to define irregulars as underdogs is to imply that superiority logically and normally lies with regular forces. Moreover, when writing of pitched battles and extended campaigns Scott reveals a sharp awareness of the strategic and tactical weaknesses of irregulars and primitives. The Highlanders, says this Borderer, did not always deserve their reputation as Britain's military darlings.5

Still, Scott himself must bear considerable responsibility for the myth of the unbeatable clansman. The Napoleonic wars were extended, nomadic affairs by land and by sea in which transportation and communications were vital and in which the technology of these military arts was of great importance. Viewed in the light of such considerations, the famous clan gathering in The Lady of the Lake, in addition to its appeal to an age obsessed with semaphores and beacons, must have had a sharper message when read with the eyes of policy and national interest. For Scott is apparently saying that, because of their primitive ingenuity, their intimate knowledge of their own terrain, their vigor and enthusiasm, these clansmen can collect a force and make it available, "in hundreds prompt for blows and blood,"6 as quickly as Napoleon managed his forces in the Italian campaign or any other. To enlist, to mobilize, to move masses of men with speed and efficiency—their capabilities most associated with Bonaparte. The clansmen, if Scott is right, could do it as well, with the help of their own superstitious zeal rather than the inspiration and guidance of the French Caesar.

Why? Isn't there something immature about a dedicated and influential British subject, writing at a time when his country was fighting for its life, celebrating in an apparent surrender to military Luddism, miraculous feats of arms by primitive or unregimented men? And were fantasies of native supermen justified even in the age of the Spanish guerillas? One begins to sense the presence of Mr. Corelli Barnett, taking
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very careful aim. This is not the occasion, nor am I the person, to estimate the military value of irregular forces. What I can do is offer some explanations for the more Romantic aspects of Scott's military writing and to show their origins, not in the fancies of authors and professional myth-makers, but in European and British thought and experience concerning national capacity and available power. My purpose is not to vindicate Scott's military Romanticism, but to demonstrate that it was at least natural and predictable, if not wholly inevitable.

Among its more important causes was the persistent eighteenth century conviction of the finitude of national strength. The late Gerhard Ritter and others saw the battle tactics characteristic of the eighteenth century as determined primarily by a sense of limited resources of arms, supplies, and human will and energy. This sense of limitation was increased, perhaps, by the eighteenth century assumption that the virtues of a culture on a particular level of development were unavailable to cultures on other levels. Despite various schematizations, there existed a fundamental dichotomy between rude, warlike states and polished, commercial, and dangerously effeminate ones. Commerce and War were like two buckets in a well: one could rise only at the expense of the other. The good cheer of William Pitt the Younger, who in 1798 could declare to Parliament that the two were compatible after all was exceptional. Excessive emphasis on Commerce led too often to luxury, effeminacy, and ultimate enslavement by a more rude and vigorous people. The words of Marshall de Saxe, far more than Pitt's, are characteristic of the century: "...as soon as discipline is neglected in a nation, as soon as comfort becomes an aim, it needs no inspiration to foretell that its ruin is near."

But the dangerous appetite for comfort was not endemic in cultures that knew it not, and advanced societies, engaged in repeated wars and needing recruits for their force, developed an understandable interest in unsophisticated, unspoiled, poverty-stricken and amorally vigorous human energy, particularly that to be found among areas of life remote from the contagion of luxurious and corrupt cities.

Both on the Continent and in Britain, but particularly in the former, the usefulness of raw, unchastened human energy was made more obvious by the collision between two historical developments: a general reluctance to enlist for military service and a general increase in the size of military forces. This conflict was dramatized by the perpetual struggle of European monarchs to maintain standing armies. These novel

institutions were greedy for men — so greedy that the recruiting officer may be taken as the true emblem of eighteenth century military life. All over Europe recruiters were bribing or bludgeoning men into the king's service — hiring prostitutes for purposes of enticement, abducting peasants from their hearthsides, attacking estates or even whole communities in order to carry off the able-bodied, even, in one case, kidnapping the personal bodyguard of a nearby monarch. We may laugh, but we must also sympathize with Jakob Lenz, the German writer who seriously proposed that the Duchy of Weimar embody a corps of Amazons recruited from its honest whores.

The extremity of such measures and proposals testifies to the desperation of the states. So crucial, in fact, was recruitment that monarchs and their ministers themselves dramatized the recruiting function at critical historical moments. Maria Theresa's famous address to the Hungarian Estates in 1741 was an act of recruitment on a grand and theatrical scale. And it was of a similar success that Chatham spoke when he boasted to Parliament of having summoned to Britain's aid the martial virtues of the North. These exhortations, celebrations, enraptured discoveries of ancient loyalty and valor, often in a region somewhat backward and exotic, kept the art of rhetoric abreast of the recruiting effort itself, which as Fritz Redlich has pointed out, "came to be based on an elaborate organization controlled by the army administration in question and with tentacles spread out in every promising area."

Redlich, writing of efforts in Germany but with relevance for all European areas, actually sees the need of the armies as leading to an extensive exploration of remote provinces, kingdoms and frontiers. War lords, he writes, "had to go far afield to find recruits. Austria, Prussia, and to a lesser extent Saxony and other states, had their recruiting agents roam all over central and eastern Europe. Prussia recruited in Mecklenburg, Western and Southern Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland, Italy, Kurland, Poland, Hungary, and the Ukraine."

Officially, at least, wild men were not wanted. Steady habits, respectable parents, useful skills — these were the proclaimed desiderata. But the market was against the recruiter. The standing army by its very nature was an alienated force and its natural reserves were liable to be found in the unassimilated or even recidivist province or region. Thus the idea of a region as a military reserve takes purposeful form, so much so that one area — the ancient battleground called Pomerania, was said to have supplied, out of its own provincial zeal, an adequate substitute for Prussia's as yet unformed national will.
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If recruiting demands led to journeys outward to sources of manpower often exotic or backward, they also led downward into the world of the poor and the criminal. As alienated bodies standing armies perforce sought the alienated within their own realms. We may be shocked to learn that in some European countries soldiers were not allowed into the taprooms of inns but had to drink their beer behind doors from mugs secured to a chain. But there is an explanation for such apparent injustice. The centrifugal character of eighteenth century recruitment efforts led to one of history's paradoxes. The eighteenth century armies were, or tried to be, models of order, pattern, discipline, and regimentation in the stanchiest sense. But primarily because of their alienated character as work forces they had little appeal to those already happily and usefully employed in occupations requiring self-discipline and drill. Thus necessity made strange bedfellows. Order not only confronted disorder, it required it. In the most literal fashion possible, the eighteenth century made heroes out of outlaws. But there is nothing surprising about this. If a region or a province could assume the role of a militia or reserve district or canton, why not particular professions that encouraged precisely the sort of furtive address that might be useful in war? If the Royal Hunt was an image of war, so was the life of crime. The criminal was at war with society, and his life was a perpetual exercise in irregular tactics. Sir John Fortescue, discussing the mutiny act of 1703, which authorized the delivery of capitial offenders from the jail into the army, writes as follows:

"...although this class of recruit does not sound desirable, yet the competition for it among colonels was so keen that a regular roster was kept to ensure that every regiment should benefit by the windfall in its turn. It must be remembered that many a man was then condemned to death, who would now be released under the First Offender's Act; but apart from this, criminals were welcome to the recruiting officer, first, because they cost nothing, and secondly, because they were often men of fine physique. In the later years of the war the sweepings of the gaols were in particular request, and the multiplication of petitions from the condemned shows that the fact was appreciated within the walls of Newgate."  

Seek as they might for the young bon bourgeois, or that eighteenth century ideal, the hardy and loyal peasant, the armies of Europe had to adjust to circumstances and to confess that alienated power might find its perfect examplar in the criminal. After all, the passage from peace to war for such people was sometimes deliciously easy. Smugglers' information was better than admirals. Not even their fondness for telling tall stories or taking an extra profit as double agents cancelled out the importance of their sheer expertise.

If the necessities of recruitment on behalf of alienated power sent recruiters among socially and geographically peripheral sources of martial skill, an important tactical development lent their efforts an additional justification. Mr. Corelli Barnett sums up the development as follows:

As the tactics of the infantry of the line became more rigid and mechanical, based on mass volley-fire, there was a need for skirmishing and scouting troops able to use ground, to delay, and to shoot accurately at individual targets. The Austrians employed Hungarians and Croatians, often irregulars. The various armies of the German states relied on companies of Jager, or gamekeepers from the boar and deer hunts of the great forests, first-class woodsmen and crack shots with rifled fire-arms. The French army too, under Saxe, raised some 5,000 light troops.

To put Barnett's idea more colorfully, the rigid formations characteristic of eighteenth century warfare required that an army patrol its own frontier with its own Daniel Boones. Moreover, more than scouting and skirmishing functions were involved. We may observe the emergence of an almost idealized irregularity in the mind of Saxe as he speculates on the efficiency of free firepower in his military Reverie. Discussing, with the greatest possible precision, the potential value of lightly armed irregulars, he writes:

Let us suppose them to begin firing at the distance of three hundred paces, which is that at which they are trained, and that they are one hundred fifty paces from me. They thus will fire during the time necessary for the enemy to march that distance, which will be from seven to eight minutes at least. My irregulars will be able to fire six times in a minute. However, I shall only say four; every one will, therefore, have fired thirty times. Consequently, every battalion will have re-
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traditional connection with the free life of a forester or mountaineer. Finally, the superior accuracy of the rifle may have produced the inevitable response on behalf of other weapons threatened with obsolescence. In defense of the old, the imagination often assigns the capacities of the advanced weapon to those more primitive. When Locksley, in Ivanhoe, in yet another demonstration of the superiority of the unregimented over those who eat the king’s bread, shivers the targeted arrow of the king’s own archer, and does so exactly on schedule, he is probably firing not a bow and arrow, but a Jager rifle, and an unusual one at that.31 The myth of the primitive marksman has been fully established.32

In other ways light, irregular, and highly mobile troops served to generate a world of dashing images. Every army had to have its light cavalry and infantry. The former was modelled on that of Hungary, and Redlich reports that everywhere these new Hussars attracted young noblemen and “adventurous commoners.”33 As for light infantry, the model was the Pandours of Franz Freiherr von Trenck, a highly mobile and skillful band of cutthroats and pillagers. Corps of light infantry in other armies than the Austrian resembled their models all too well. One typical regulation forbade the detachment of less than twenty men lest a smaller group be mistaken for highwaymen — a possibility not entirely to be blamed on a bigoted or ungrateful citizenry.34 Looting, after all, was a privilege often reserved for light troops although, except for Trenck’s Pandours, they did little harm because they were so mobile. Thus if recruitment demands led to the use of far off regions and alienated classes, new tactical emphases did likewise, bringing the life of crime or amoral dexterity still closer to the life of military success.

And now to return to Scott. In a letter to Lady Abercorn he rather apologetically writes: “a robber or Captain of Banditti never comes across me but he becomes my hero.”35 He needn’t have sounded so sheepish. He was born into a century that located the possibility of militant and heroic action largely among the eccentric, the peripheral, the skillfully primitive, the exotic, the incompletely assimilated or even dangerous man or province. I have indicated elsewhere that Scott was too suspicious of mere irregularity to swallow it whole,37 but the man who could speak of the Prussian Major Schill as having suffered “the doom due to unauthorized robbers and pirates — a doom which, since the days of Wallace and Llewellyn, has been frequently inflicted by oppressors on those by whom their tyranny has been resisted,” and who was later to note that Wallace himself had begun his rebellion with the help of outlaws, was very likely indeed to let Rob Roy, not his formal hero, kill the villain.38

cieved four or five hundred shots before the engagement can possibly commence. And from whom? From troops who have spent their life firing at a greater distance, who are not drawn up in close order, and who fire at ease without waiting for the word of command. They are not kept in the constrained attitude which is customary in the ranks, where the men crowd one another, and prevent their taking a steady aim. I contend that a single shot from one of these irregulars is worth ten from any other.35

Saxe is obviously discussing muskets, not rifles, which could fire only about a third as fast.36 But this fact, considering the comparative inaccuracy of muskets, only makes the message seem the more utopian. Not only will the situation be far more messy than the Marshall’s precise figures indicate, but his “ten times more effective” suggests that Saxe is moving in the direction of myth, in this case the military myth of the miraculously accurate irregular marksman. A thesis has generated its antithesis; regularity has begun an idealized irregularity in the best Hegelian fashion.

But if tactical changes and the fantasies accompanying them led to a tendency to find glamour and extraordinary powers among irregulars, another explanation for the same phenomenon must lie in the development of what we might call a “miracle of technology” — the rifle. This weapon had been long known, but its extensive use in armies began in the eighteenth century.37 Nearly everything about it fostered a romantic view of its powers and those of its users. In 1605, in a shooting contest in Basle, rifles were assigned a three-and-a-half foot target at 805 feet; later, in America, the famous turkey shoot invited marksmen to hit the bobbing head of a turkey at a range of 250 or 350 feet, depending upon whether or not a rest was used.38 Clearly, there was witchcraft in the air. Moreover, the expense of the rifle served, at least at first, to give glamour to its possessor. Riflemen at first had to bring their own weapons and thus enjoyed the comparative freedom of men not dependent upon the king’s purse.39 Even the drawbacks of the rifle served to give an air of mystery to the rifleman. It could not hold a bayonet, and its rate of fire was slow. For these reasons its defensive capacities were slight. George Washington had to caution Daniel Morgan never to let his riflemen get caught where they could not run to safety.40 This invitation to disappear into the greenwood whenever necessary reinforced and perpetuated an association with wild nature and deep woods that derived from the rifleman’s
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Furthermore, Scott was a Briton, and while his kingdom had her small standing army and her problems of recruitment, she was also committed to the celebration of irregularity in war in ways of her own. Relentlessly, and sometimes inconsistently, her Mutiny Acts from 1689 onwards proclaimed the illegality of a standing army, and many of her pro-militia pamphleteers and orators labored to convince the country that the unspoiled, unregimented, indigenous man was not necessarily a potential redcoat but rather an adequate substitute for him. Similarly the shire or the region was no mere reservoir of military talent awaiting fulfillment by means of the uniform and the barracks its martial energies were superior as is, to regiments of permanently embodied mercenary soldiers. These arguments did not take place in a vacuum; in fact the prestige of the more primitive and colorful of the Austrian levies had its effect on the militia debates in Commons prior to 1757. Nevertheless, the ideas that a militant could supplant or "counterbalance" an army was as old as 1648, and a militia was always associated with locality, regionalism, and the martial skills peculiar to a particular place. In this connection it is noteworthy that the same pro-militia arguments that dealt with the prowess of Hussars, Croats, and Pandourds also linked them argumentatively to the early victories of the Highlanders in the '45. The clansmen were militiamen par excellence.

Thus Britain, endlessly wary of the possible encroachment of royal authority through the instrumentality of a standing army, was psychologically prepared to celebrate irregularity even without the stimulus of the recruiting needs of a standing force.

However, there was anxiety about British military capacity from another quarter. The image of the two buckets in a well — the fear that no nation could be both commercially and militarily successful — was a particularly haunting one for so commercially successful a nation as England, and no mind was more persistently disturbed by it than Scott's teacher at the University of Edinburgh, Adam Ferguson — one of the most militant of all social philosophers. Ferguson's mind brooded on the dangers of prosperity, which alienated military capacity from the fireside. Republican Rome was an ideal because its people were animated by a military spirit. On the other hand, the Carthaginians were an example to be avoided, for they had the misfortune to make war without becoming warlike. What was true of Carthage was also dangerously true of Britain. John Bull was like an over-prosperous householder who, because of his wealth "neglected sending his children to school, locked up their cudgels and cricket-batts, [sic] and would not let one of them touch a gun, for fears they should hurt themselves." Ferguson's fear of a Carthaginian Britain led him into a wariness of standing armies. He regarded them as exhibiting the dangers of alienation in two ways. As separate bodies with separate interests they were too easily tempted to carve for themselves among the contending factions of the state — to become, in fact, the chief danger to the liberty of the states they were intended to protect. In addition — and here Ferguson is more original by far — they subjected their soldiers to conditions of labor that deadened them to their tasks. The repetitious drill inflicted upon the regular soldier presented the dangerous paradox of a man becoming so used to arms that he was literally rehearsed into competence.

No British writer on military matters seems to have given as much thought as Ferguson to the concrete texture of experience in war and on the parade ground. An entire psycho-physical process comes under scrutiny. Ferguson tried to give full consideration to the possible feelings of a man who is given a gun or a cutlass for the first time or, conversely, has had his fill of drilling in order to mass-produce shot under orders. Living in the age of the Frederician military model, when intensive practice "raised the Prussian rate of fire to three or four shots a minute," and when the Prussian regiment became "a machine of mass-fire, instantly obedient to its officers," — an age, in short, in which military training and tactics anticipated the "speed-up" of the modern assembly line — Ferguson saw danger to basic military skills in such procedures. Numbness of soul and body threatened, for, as he writes in his Essay on the History of Civil Society it is the handmaiden of repetitious exercise:

It may even be doubted, whether the measure of national capacity increases with the advancement of arts. Many mechanical arts, indeed, require no capacity; they succeed best under a total suppression of sentiment and reason; and ignorance is the mother of industry as well as of superstition. Reflection and fancy are subject to err; but a habit of moving the hand, or the foot, is independent of either. Manufactures, accordingly, prosper most, where the mind is least consulted, and where the workshops may, without any great effort of imagination, be considered as an engine, the parts of which are men.

No wonder Ferguson's thought arrived by its own paths to conclusions similar to those of many a recruiting officer. In a pamphlet arguing the
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animals, whose "disposition to contest and struggle is . . . often free from hostility" and whose playful fondling is "an image of war." 54 There can be little question that Walter Scott as a student was fully exposed to an admired professor's vision of unalienated labor in the combative sense—a spontaneous overflow of the martial spirit inevitably different from and opposed to the mechanistic parody of such actity by regimented automata.

But even had Scott dozed through Ferguson's lectures he clearly had a keen interest in a work of Ferguson's that exhibited the same attitudes in the form of a satirical prose allegory. Ferguson's Proceedings in the Case of Margaret argues for a Scottish militia in the manner of Arbuthnot, employing the same burlesque names for the rulers of Europe used by Arbuthnot in his John Bull pamphlets. 55 (Ferguson may have chosen this medium partly out of a wariness of mere abstractions, which he regarded as potential inhibitors of action). 56 The Proceedings depicts John Bull as "up to the eyes in clay, or steeped, till he grew all the colours of the rainbow, in dyer's stuff, or smoaked and roasted like a smith, or sallow and greasy like a weaver," in short, anything but warlike. 57 When guns go off such men can only shut their eyes and stop their ears. He therefore goes the way of Carthage and Lewis Baboon and hires a set of "gamekeepers" — a standing army. The gamekeepers are "set apart from the rest of the family" and are a dangerous set of humanoids who "obey their leader implicitly and . . . know no law but his commands . . . . 58 Such men are a threat to the estate that supports them, for "we endeavour . . . by throwing them into a separate way of life, to weaken their connection within the family, and to stifle the sentiments of filial tenderness and respect, under the load of artificial subordination, to which they are bound for life. The familiar use of arms may fortify the breast; but more is required to accomplish a faithful and dutiful child, a tender, a generous affection, to that parent, whom he is bound to defend." 59 Even those who join such a body of men from motives of patriotic zeal soon lose it and only "servile dependence" on their officers is left. And even their "familiar use of arms" is of doubtful value when, as Ferguson says, they "did nothing from morning to night, but first turn upon one heel, and then upon another, put a gun sometimes to their hip, sometimes to their nose, sometimes to their shoulder, and, in short played so many antic tricks with a musket, that few or none of them could remember or distinguish its real use." 60 It was not always so. In healthier days every Briton "had his cutlass, or his carabine at his bed's head," 61 and thus the state could profit from the skill and address common to all indigenous warriors.
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When we know Ferguson we are better able to understand why Arthur Phillipson performed his miracle with the bow of Buttisholz. He may have been in Switzerland, but he was an Englishman and the weapon was the bow, as familiar to him as the bows of Lockley’s foresters were to the outlawed yeomen. We also have a better understanding of why those foresters were, in fact, outlaws, for the skills Ferguson looks for were bound to be discovered, on the local level, among men whose lives might not bear too much examination, and, on the international scene, among Europe’s peripheral chivalry — Highlanders, outlanders, unreconstructed regionalists — all those partaking in some degree of the world of the Haiduks, the rough, free, turbulent chivalry of the old Turkish wars, men of whom it might be said, as was said of the modern Brazilian bandit Lampaio, “His Darling was the dagger/ His gift was the gun.....”62 It was all very well for Ferguson’s Sister Peg, representing the whole of Scotland, to complain that MacLurchar, the wild Highlander in the garret, was being given arms while the rest of the nation — the douce loyal remnant, in fact, was denied its militia.63 The exigencies of defense pointed straight toward the wilder shores of life. The Scottish militia had to wait, but the formation of Highland regiments went on.

Scott’s debt to Ferguson, and the extent to which he embraced the ideal of indigenous weaponry is perhaps best revealed in a famous scene in The Talisman, involving that archetype of all benign outlawry, Saladin himself. Having, in a contest of weaponry with Richard the Lionhearted, severed with his scimitar an object no more resistant than a cushion, the Sultan, responding to De Vaux’s accusation of witchcraft,

Undid the sort of veil which he had hitherto worn, laid it double along the edge of his sabre, extended the weapon edgeways in the air, and drawing it suddenly through the veil, although it hung on the blade entirely loose, severed that also into two parts, which floated to different sides of the tent, equally displaying the extreme temper and sharpness of the weapon and the exquisite dexterity of him who used it.64

Here the reader in his turn may again wonder what devil has taken command of Scott’s pen, but it is Saladin himself who supplies the better answer: “each land,” he says, “hath its own exercises....”65

Scott’s exotic setting reminds us again that these phenomena did not arise in a British context alone. His wide knowledge of Continental literature acquainted him with images of irregular and indigenous skills and virtues born out of the Continental experience of wars. The translator of Goetz von Berlichingen and the German ballads was as well acquainted with images of skilled and exuberant action as he was with various examples of diablerie. Moreover, the young man who, in his own words, was “once taken in by the bombast of Schiller,”66 obviously never lost his affection for robbers or for marvelous bowmen capable of feats of marksmanship on demand.

But such images were like the pictures of dashing Hungarians that crowded into the mids of the parliamentarians who had debated the militia decades before — they were bound to intrude where the ground had been so well prepared for them. In Scott’s case the ancient British affection for the idea of localized and unregimented martial energy, persistently cultivated by those who fancied a threat to liberty in a real or imagined Caesarism equipped with an institutionalized armed force, had been sharpened by Ferguson’s concern over the roots of action which, in its interest in psycho-physical actualities, anticipated the concrete representations of fiction itself.

A final word: my purpose here extends beyond a desire to throw some light on the history of military thinking and imagining in the eighteenth century. There is a far more tempting target available, and it has its own special importance. Despite the most distinguished efforts of our most dedicated scholars, the movement in literature and art that we call Romanticism still suffers from a perverse adherence to a myth generated by critics and cultural historians — the myth of a gratuitous and explosive reaction against reason and common sense far in excess of whatever causes might have preceded it.67 We however, have seen what a natural connection existed between some very wild and improbable episodes of Romantic fiction and the most pressing and inescapable realities and anxieties of European life. I suggest that there may be other areas of Romanticism that could be similarly dealt with. If there are let us lose no time doing so.

Footnotes

1 Anne of Geierstein, Ch. 4 and The Bride of Lammermoor, Ch. 5. All references are to the Deyghur Edition of the Waverley Novels (London and Edinburgh, 1892).
4 See Old Mortality, Chs. 16-17 and 32, Waverley, Ch. 47, and Ivanhoe, Chs. 29-31.

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Frederick the Great! A Historical Profile, tr. Peter Paret (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 142. See, in addition, Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire: 1740-1763 (New York, 1940), 82.

Adam Smith, for example, writing in the tradition of the Scottish social historians, describes four stages of society, those of hunters, herdsmen, husbandmen, and that of artificers and manufacturers, but the basic dualism remains: the first three are all warlike in varying degrees, the last is not and must therefore bear the expense of a standing army. See The Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (New York, The Modern Library, 1937), 653-669. Similar views, although with greater emphasis upon the debilitating effects of commerce, are to be found in his Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, Edwin Cannan, ed. (Oxford, 1890) 257-62.


The deleterious effects of prosperity were not entirely imaginary. The colony of Virginia was a fair example of a society deprived by success of its martial capacities. See John Shy, Toward Lexington (New York, 1970), 10-11.


Richard Friedenthal, Goethe (London, 1963), 177.

A translation of Maria Theresa's address is to be found in William Coxe's History of the House of Austria, (3 vols., London, 1873), III, pp. 269-70. Chatham's celebration of Northern valor is in Chauncey A. Goodrich, D.D., Select British Eloquence... (Indianapolis, 1963), 103-14. See, in addition, my forthcoming article "Scott and the Highlanders" referred to above.

Redlich, op. cit., 176-77.

Ibid., 180-81.

Ibid., p.190.


Redlich offers two causes of this reluctance: a general improvement in economic conditions and the fact that as warfare became less destructive fewer men took refuge in an army. Ibid., II, p.172.


Ivanhoe, Ch. 13.

Britain and Her Army, p.177.


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27 Ibid., pp.136-44.
28 Ibid., pp.135-36 and 140.
30 Peterson, op. cit., 144.
31 Ivanhoe, Ch. 13.
32 The word "myth" in this case does not necessarily imply something totally unreal, but rather a narrative theme capable of asserting itself in various contexts without full empirical justification. I am indebted to Mr. Corelli Barnett for suggesting a connection between the Jager rifle and the reputation of the primitive marksman. He is not to be held responsible for the use I have made of his suggestion.
33 Redlich, op. cit., 137-38.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p.221.
36 Letters, II, 312.
40 Ibid., 107-08.
43 Ferguson's account of the rise of Caesar stresses the freedom of the military from civil control in Cisalpine Gaul — a curcumstance that allowed Caesar to develop his army as an independent force and to use it against the Republic. A History of the... Roman Republic, III, 101-02. Ferguson's history, and particularly its third volume, is an encyclopeda of the ill consequences of allowing an ambitious man to acquire "a numerous army... well inured to service, and attached to his person." (III, 220). In this connection, his comment on the Tudors is revealing, All they needed to establish a "perfect despotism" was "a few regiments of troops under the command of the crown." (An Essay on the History of Civil Society [2nd ed., London, 1768], 158n.). David Kettler writes that Ferguson feared that "the onset of perf and coolly calculating warfare would kill the high-minded spirit of patriotism engendered by the complete self-abandonment of a whole society to a life-or-death struggle." He also says that Ferguson welcomed the "distinction between soldier and civilian." I am principally impressed by the fear of alienated professionalism, and Kettler's analysis gives full weight to this fear. See The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson, (1965), 6 and 88ff.
46 See the anonymously published Reflection Previous to the Establishment of a Militia, (London, 1756), 17.
47 Miscellaneous Prose, XIX, pp.333.
48 Letters, IV, 54, 181-82. In a letter to James Skene's daughter he recommended Ferguson alongside of Gibbon as an authority on Rome (Letters, VIII, 44.3). A letter to Lockhart in 1827 urges his son-in-law to remember Ferguson in a projected Quarterly Review article (Letters, X, 209).
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50 Institutes of Moral Philosophy; For the Use of Students in the College of Edinburgh (2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1773) and Principles of Moral and Political Science; Being Chiefly a Retrospect of Lectures delivered in the College of Edinburgh (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1792), hereafter abbreviated as Institutes and Principles.
51 Principles, II, 502.
52 Ibid., I, 177.
53 Institutes, 268.
54 Principles, I, 16.
55 Scott refers to Ferguson's piece in his affectionate account of the efforts of the Poker Club. (Miscellaneous Prose, XIX, pp. 336), He may also have paid Ferguson the tribute of imitation in a satirical piece concerning affairs in Spain, the "Letter from John Bull to the Editor of the Edinburgh Weekly Journal," published in the issue of May 7, 1823. The piece is entertaining, particularly in its references to the Holy Alliance as the "Bible Society." While Arbuthnot obviously deserves the ultimate credit, Scott's reference to Scotland as "civil, decent, neighbourly" clearly recalls Ferguson's description of Sister Peg as "a quiet easy-tempered, good-conditioned body . . . ." (Proceedings, 86.) There is no parallel to this in Arbuthnot.
56 Institutes, p. 62.
57 Proceedings, 17-18.
58 Ibid., 155.
59 Ibid., 182-83.
60 Ibid., 35.
61 Ibid., 26.
63 Proceedings, 109.
64 The Tallisman, Ch. 27.
65 Ibid., Ch. 27.
66 Letters, II, 495.

The 'Walter Scott' Letters in the Ewen-Graham Collection at the University of Guelph
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In the spring of 1976 the Interdepartmental Committee for Scottish Studies and the University of Guelph were fortunate to acquire the Ewen-Graham collection of Scottish business letters and documents. This acquisition was made possible through the generosity of the MacDonald-Stewart Foundation under Mr. David Stewart to whom our most sincere thanks.

The collection comprises several thousand items, being the records of John Ewen of Aberdeen, merchant, and his successors, and covers a period of commercial development from the mid-eighteenth century onwards till well into the nineteenth century. Its value as social record for the study of the commerce of the period and the parallel urban development of Aberdeen is therefore immense as it will provide research material for historical scholarships for many a year. Indeed, our first graduate student is already cutting her scholarly teeth on this collection.

The acquisition of this material by a Canadian university caused apparently quite a stir in the Old Country, notwithstanding the fact that learned insitutions in Scotland had had the chance to acquire the collection and had blissfully ignored it.

The chief reason for the clamour was the fact that the collection contained a bundle of letters which bore the name of Walter Scott. The loss of documents bearing the second holy name of, and in, Scotland was apparently considered a national disaster equal to the debacle of 1745.

Yet a moment's reflection would have shown that literary gems could hardly be expected to emerge from a correspondence conducted with a