he last Scottish Parliament voted itself out of existence in 1707, and ended Scotland’s claim to be a politically independent country. It seemed, as the Chancellor of Seafield said, “ane end of ane auld sang”. The vote concluded several years of furious argument, in Parliament, in the streets, and in many pamphlets, about whether Scotland was worth preserving, with the threat of force and even full-scale war in the background. Yet it went against the wishes of the great majority of the people, who would have endorsed the words of a new song: “We’re bought and sold for English gold / Such a parcel of rogues in a nation.”¹ This article examines the unpopular but successful case made by the “rogues,” in favour of Union with England. It begins with a brief description of the social and political situation, and of the case for Scottish nationalism according to Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun. It then presents the case for Union and against an independent Scotland, as made in the writings of Defoe, William Paterson, William Seton (also known as Lord Pitmeddon), and Sir John Clerk of Pennycuik. These are probably the best of the advocates for Union, and their writings on this topic deserve more attention than they have received (Defoe, Paterson, and Clerk are quite well known in history, but for other reasons). Finally, the article glances at the effects of the Union, and at possible applications of the pro-Union arguments to the present.

Andrew Fletcher’s First Discourse Concerning the Affairs of Scotland, published in 1698, makes the case for an independent Scotland, and also initiates the debate on Union, on whether Scotland should go it alone or join England. Pamphlets on both sides soon appeared in large numbers. Scotland’s situation was then desperate: many had died in the famines of 1695-99
and the economy had collapsed, the immediate cause being the failure of the Darien Expedition (an attempt to colonize modern Panama in 1698-99) which lost about a quarter of Scotland’s capital. The political situation made it difficult to initiate any improvements. Since 1603, Scotland had retained its own Parliament, but this had little independent power — until, ironically, its last few years, as it debated its own abolition. The London Government ruled Scotland, yet frequently treated the Scots as aliens and denied them free trade with England. Most Scots believed that almost anything would be better than the political status quo, and this belief is common ground for both sides in the debate about full Union with England.

In 1701 the English Parliament passed an Act settling the British Crown, after Queen Anne’s death, on the family of Hanover, and thus rejecting the Stuart line of James II. It assumed that Scottish agreement was not required, although in fact the two countries were still constitutionally separate. The Scots were — predictably — upset, but also realized that the issue gave them a fairly strong bargaining point, which might be used to demand either greater independence (real power for the Scottish Parliament) or greater equality with England (in a Union of Parliaments) — in return for accepting the Hanoverians.

In 1703 a motion in the Scottish Parliament to “abjure the Pretender,” reject the son of James II and the Stuart line, was almost unanimously defeated. Actually, most Scottish MPs distrusted the Stuarts and preferred the prospect of the Hanoverians, but to say so would weaken their bargaining position. The other Scots’ bargaining point, or background threat, was that they might simply defy the London government, and declare Scotland a fully independent country. The problem with this was that the country would then have to be defended, and probably against the Duke of Marlborough’s armies. Still, a conquest of Scotland would have been difficult while England was heavily engaged in war on the continent, and holding Scotland under subjection even more difficult. George Ridpath’s controversial pamphlet, “The Reducing of Scotland by Arms” (1705) is not — as the title might suggest — an instruction manual, but a warning: nemo me impune lacessit (the motto
of the kings of Scotland —if you attack me, you’ll suffer for it).

Fletcher was easily the best known exponent of the nationalist case, and both supporters and opponents are usually writing with his views in mind. After 1703 he was a member of Parliament, and his speeches were printed as pamphlets and enthusiastically received. His nationalism is in part anti-English. He argues that the English are hostile to other countries: they have mistreated Ireland for centuries, and exploited Scotland since 1603. For example, the wars against France were for English interests, but expended Scottish blood in “treble proportion,” and Scotland is now (1698) being taxed “beyond measure”. The English will always treat the Scots as inferiors, and indeed the proposed Union would really be a subjection of Scotland to England.

On the positive side, Fletcher’s nationalism begins with the axiom that “no inclination is so honourable” as “love of that country and society” one is born in (the first sentence of his Two Discourses Concerning the Affairs of Scotland). But this does raise the issue of how one defines one’s country, for by this period, a Scot had the option of choosing Great Britain. For Fletcher, however, a country should be small enough in area for the capital city to be accessible to all landowners, without their having to leave their estates for long periods, and small enough in population for all influential people to know each other. (Scotland seems rather too big to fit this description, and indeed Fletcher’s “country” probably excludes the Highlands. In his “Account of a Conversation” (1703), where he airily proposes splitting Europe up into City States, Scotland is to provide two, with centres at Stirling and Inverness, presumably for the Lowlands and Highlands.) Fletcher argues that there are economic advantages in limiting a country to this size, partly because the upper classes will not be tempted to leave their estates and live and spend their money in some distant metropolitan centre. There is also a greater chance of democracy, in that a Parliament will be more responsible to its voters, who have access to the capital.

Fletcher does not view Scottish society as generally superior, but he does believe that the Scots still value liberty above all, whereas the English no longer do. Their ancient constitution has
decayed, “jealousy for publick liberty is vanished,” and they are willing to accept as king a potential tyrant. Union would mean that the Scots also lost their liberty. This, of course, raises the questions of what is meant by “liberty” and how far the Scots actually enjoyed it. In Fletcher’s view, liberty means not being entirely subjected to another man and having meaningful powers of choice. He acknowledges that the higher the social rank, the greater range of choice—in a free society. Under a tyrant, even an aristocrat does not have liberty, because he does not have significant choices: all important matters are decided by the tyrant. As to how far the Scots are free, Fletcher evidently believes that they are potentially so, if Scotland remains a nation. However, Union with England would mean the end of liberty (or the hope of liberty) for the Scots, because the English no longer preserve it even for themselves, and the Scots would be treated as inferiors.

As Parliamentary debate intensified, Fletcher and other defenders of Scottish independence had to become more specific about what they were proposing for the near future, and reconsider what was likely to be persuasive. Most of them take the position that they are not against “Union” so long as it is a “Federal Union.” Scotland and England would become one to the extent that there would be free trade between them, but Scotland would retain her Parliament. It is, however, disingenuous to describe this proposal as “Union,” as its supporters intend Scotland to retain sovereignty. In the context of this debate, “Federal Union” becomes (rather confusingly) almost synonymous with “Scottish Independence.” The writers on the actual pro-Union side wish to abolish the Scottish Parliament and many features of the Scottish Nation and become British (or, in Seton’s case, more or less English). Defoe, Paterson, John Clerk, and William Seton were all in some sense paid to support the Union—the latter two in particular were very well rewarded for helping to negotiate the terms and get them passed by the Scottish Parliament—but this does not in itself invalidate their arguments. They do seem concerned about public good if not about public opinion, which was strongly against them.

Defoe was normally based in London, and his early pro-Union pamphlets are addressed to the English. He was in
Scotland from September 1706, when the last Union debate began in the Scottish Parliament, until it passed the Articles of Union in January 1707. His duties there were to keep the London government informed of developments, lobby for the Union with influential people, and write pamphlets in its support. Despite being a government propagandist, Defoe was sincere in most of his arguments and, unlike most Englishmen of the period, both knowledgeable and sympathetic about Scotland. In 1709 he published A History of the Union; it is mainly a compilation of documents, but the “Dedication” to Queen Anne is (rather surprisingly) a good summary of Defoe’s position. He believes that the island of Britain is a natural unit for a country, and war between Scotland and England is “cutting the throats of our Brethren.” The primary advantages of the Union are peace and security; in the past both countries—and particularly Scotland—have been impoverished by war with each other. Peace, and the removal of trade barriers, will lead to greatly increased trade and prosperity (an especially important point for a country which experienced famine). There will also be increased liberty for the common people. Despite the claims that Scotland is a free country, many Scots are not free because of the feudal nature of the laws and customs, but rather in a “state of bondage to their Governors”. England, on the other hand, is the “freest Nation in the World”.

Defoe is not exaggerating his distaste for Scottish feudal “superiorities” (where a tenant farmer could be almost completely at the mercy of his landowner, economically and even in law). On the other hand, his confidence in English justice and the English constitution is not as great as he claims. Here he flatters his dedicatee, the Queen, and does not mention his own time in jail and the pillory for criticizing the government. Defoe suffered partly because he was a dissenter, and most Scots, as Presbyterians, would also become dissenters if Anglicanism were to become the established church of all Great Britain. (It was already established in Ireland, though the majority of the people were Catholic.) Therefore, even in this “Dedication” to the head of the Anglican Church, Defoe stresses the importance of maintaining Presbyterianism as the Church of Scotland, claiming
that this would avoid religious persecution and, more broadly, safeguard many Scottish customs and liberties. Defoe, more than the three Scottish Unionists, supports a Union where Scotland retains some of her distinctiveness.

Paterson was a Scot but had lived in England a long time; indeed, he was one of the founders of the Bank of England (as well as deviser of the ill-fated Darien scheme). The Commissioners of Union employed him to make some of their calculations. His main writings on the Union are "Proceedings of the Wednesday's Club" and five Letters on the Union, all written in 1706. They are interspersed with lively ideas only tangentially connected with the Union, such as government granaries to feed the poor, efficient tax collecting, a canal between the Forth and Clyde. His arguments for Union are mainly economic, and tend to become detailed tables of what tax revenues can be expected — though he is very optimistic here. The advantages of a complete Union seem to him so obvious that he tends to simply dismiss other views. The pamphlets written against Union are "long, tedious and perplexed heaps of words, or at least of ordinary and trifling matter". (This is, admittedly, not unfair as a description of one of the three best known anti-Union writers, James Hodges.)

On political issues, Paterson makes some legitimate points. He appreciates that Fletcher and most other advocates of a "federal" Union (with separate parliaments) really want an independent Scotland. And his case that a federal Union could not work for long is plausible: he argues that the apparently successful examples cited by his opponents — usually ancient Greece, Switzerland, and Holland — were either temporarily united by external pressures, or were actually dominated by one state of the confederacy. But Paterson usually brushes aside political problems, believing that the Union will dissolve all differences between Scotland and England — they will simply seek to exist in the larger Great Britain. Thus his non-economic case for Union is perfunctory and rather beside the point. (He falls back on the ad baculum arguments that England will not accept anything other than complete Union, so it must be accepted, and that no-one should try to lessen the power of the
monarch, because this could be construed as treason.) When he
returns to the subject of the Union in 1717, in another set of
"Wednesday Club" proceedings, he tacitly concedes that so far it
has not been a success. But his only remedy is economic exhor-
tation: we have to eliminate corruption and inefficiency and all
will be well. The "Wednesday" publication is a conversation
between many speakers and this makes for easy reading, though
sometimes also for effects that Patterson did not intend. The
exchanges at the end of the 1706 series, on the benefits of Union,
sound rather like Mr. Hold-the-World, Mr. Money Love, and
their associates in Pilgrim's Progress: "Mr. Sands said, he was not
only fully convinced of the great benefits and advantages of the
Union, but that there neither was, or possibly could be, any
reasonable objection against it." (I.249) There are dimensions of
the Union debate that completely elude Patterson, especially the
nationalist one.

Sir John Clerk was a follower of the Duke of Queensberry,
who pushed through the Union (and made a large fortune in
the process) over a period of several years. Clerk was one of the
33 Commissioners who actually negotiated the terms of the
Union, a member of the Scottish Parliament that ratified it, and
one of the 45 Scottish MPs who joined the British Parliament.
Long afterwards (probably between 1724 and 1730 but with later
revisions for another twenty years) he wrote a history of relations
between Scotland and England, including a detailed account
of the Union negotiations and the final debates in the Scottish
Parliament. Other comments appear in his Memoirs. The history
is written in Latin, and was not published till this century. Clerk
probably believed that the Latin added weight and dignity to his
thoughts, and may have intended to deter the hoi polloi from
ever reading and criticizing. The Latin is also appropriate in that
he hoped Great Britain would emulate the Roman Empire, in
attaining political stability and a high level of civilization.

Clerk admits the very widespread opposition to the Union,
perhaps even exaggerates it, when he says not one in a hundred
Scots was in favour. He also admits the general belief that
those who voted for the Union did so merely to receive "places"
and payments: "we are commonly labelled courtiers and
mercenaries" (indeed, his own father was scandalized by the proceedings.) He concedes a few of the economic points made by the nationalists, notably Fletcher. Being far from Court, as the Scots now are, is a real disadvantage. And smaller countries, like Scotland, may allow a more even — fairer — distribution of wealth (though his main point here is that large states are more secure). But the History attempts to show that Union of Scotland with England was natural, inevitable, and highly desirable. They occupy one island, speak the same language, and have very much the same culture. (Clerk even claims that English is the aboriginal — pre-Roman — language of Britain!) Where Scotland differs, it is usually for the worse. The nobility oppress their tenants by short leases (and therefore many evictions) and by their Barony Courts, where landlords could decide cases in their own favour. The people suffer from "torpor and sloth" and drunkenness. If Scotland ever was a viable country, it has become "a meer shadow and an empty name". The English, on the other hand, are "known throughout Europe for their love of liberty and commercial expertise" (a neat pairing). Scottish Presbyterianism has to be retained as a sop to the people, but Scottish laws should be amalgamated with English, though this may be a two-way process.7

Clerk is a nationalist, then, but an English one. He despises "French promises and Highland armies" and the country he feels allegiance to is bounded by the Highland line and the English Channel. Lowland Scotland is only a rather small part of this, though Clerk cherishes the belief — not abandoned even in the 1730s — that the names of Scotland and England will disappear to be replaced by “Britain”. His patriotism seems to be bound up with allegiance to the monarch. The spiritual heart of his country is where the king is, and since 1603 that is London. (This contrasts with the views of most Scots, who had no difficulty envisaging their country without a particular king. As the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 states: if one king is unsatisfactory they can make another.) Clerk is defeatist in that he thinks England could easily prevent Scotland becoming independent again, even if that were desirable, and he admires England partly for its size and power. Yet he is not a worshipper of power...
per se nor, in his own view, a time server. Size brings stability, which allows real civilization to flourish, which entails prosperity and freedom, and not least for the common people. True freedom is from want and arbitrary arrest; granted these, various choices become possible, for example to enjoy and patronize the arts, as Clerk himself did. He firmly believed there was no such freedom in the wasteland of seventeenth-century Scotland, and that it could not exist in any future Scottish state.

Yet Clerk’s History is not a convincing apologia. He insists too much and too implausibly on the long-standing, unified Britishness of Britain: Bruce’s oration before the battle of Bannockburn becomes an appeal to British (not Scottish) nationalism. For the contemporary period, he asserts the benefits of the Union, but not very specifically and without proof or examples of the greater prosperity he mentions. The impression given is that he is no longer convinced that the Union was indeed a blessing, and his Memoirs tend to confirm this. In 1743 he laments that an Englishman has been made Chief Baron of the Exchequer in Scotland, though Clark was the obvious candidate: “those who have friends in any great offices in England will always be preferred to any Scotsman”. His vision of Britain has appeal, but does not seem to have become a reality.

William Seton of Pitmeddon was also one of the Commissioners who negotiated the Union. He is unusual among politicians in that what he wrote in opposition a book titled The Interest of Scotland in Three Essays (1700), is consistent with what he wrote as a member of the government, “Scotland’s Great Advantages by a Union with England” (1706), and with his speeches in Parliament on that topic. Seton’s emotional allegiance is to Britain, and largely to England. He sees Scotland and England as similar in language, religion (Protestant), politics (both have a limited monarchy) and general customs. They should work together, especially against the commercial competition of Holland. On the other hand, the Scottish Highlanders are foreign undesirables. An advantage of the Union is that it will pressure them: “to forsake their Ancient Customs and Language, and to apply themselves to Virtue and Industry”. Seton also argues, more strongly and specifically than Clerk, that
even the Scottish Lowlanders have much to learn from the English. Most Scottish institutions are clearly inferior to their English counterparts. Scottish education is weak and impractical. (Clerk agreed. He thought his two years studying philosophy at Glasgow a waste of time.) The clergy are underpaid and frequently ignorant, merchants incompetent, and many landowners idle and avaricious. The systems of short-term leases and Barony (landlords') Courts are unfair to the tenant farmers, commercially and legally, so that they have no real freedom. The common people eat badly and lack English enterprise and daring; they have only “a timorous civility” (an odd description of the Edinburgh mob). How would Union change this? First, there would be an infusion of English ideas: agriculture would be better organized, and the people would have more food; and the replacement of Barony Courts by neutral judges, who could arbitrate fairly between tenant and landlord, would be a great advance in justice. Many landowners might go off to live near the Court in England, but this would be a plus — their tenants would flourish better without them. More fundamentally, there would be a great increase in security and trade — no more wars with England and free trade across the border — from which everyone would benefit.10

Seton is the most pragmatic and politically knowledgeable of the four advocates for Union: even in 1700, he is arguing tactically that it is time to make a deal. The English are at war, need the security of a safe northern frontier, and will offer good terms. The pamphlet and speeches of 1706 make much the same points, theoretical and tactical, more vehemently. Seton does have to argue against the Nationalists proposed “federal union” which he does on the usual Unionist grounds: either a federal union is another name for effective independence, or it means continuing the system of the last hundred years where Scotland has only token independence and is treated as an inferior dependency of England. Nationalist talk of losing an “ancient kingdom” is only words: the kingdom disappeared in 1603, and anyway should be un lamented. If we try to return to independence, we are left with a “Gothick Constitution” (with no real justice), rack-renting landlords, and a hopelessly weak economy — Scotland
does not produce anything good or cheap enough for other countries to want it. And the English will work against us. The choice is really between: “Union with Peace and Plenty or Dis-Union with Slavery and Poverty”.11

This is a good summary of the core positions of all four advocates of Union, though elsewhere they sometimes disagree. Defoe is anxious to preserve the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, largely as a safeguard for political and economic freedom. Paterson is too much concerned with the encouragement of business to be concerned with such issues, though his liberal view of economics — few regulations, free competition — seems to be balanced by rather left-wing political views not unlike Defoe’s: for example, the rich tend to be taxed too little and the poor and middling too much. For Seton, and probably Clerk, retaining the Church of Scotland is only a rather unwelcome concession, that probably has to be made for the Union to pass the Scottish Parliament. Nor are they concerned to preserve Scottish identity or, to any great extent, safeguard free speech. They tend to agree with the King of Brobdingnag (in Book II, chapter 6, of Gulliver’s Travels) that heterodox opinions are best left unspoken. In practice, they wish to limit political dissent to their own, landed class. Clerk imagines Great Britain as a recreation of the Roman Empire: in his idealized version, the subjected peoples are admitted to equal rights with the Romans (English) and retain some of their national characteristics. This vision is not shared by the others. Seton, otherwise closest to Clerk, wants to become English and be done with it.

Yet, with the exception of the Church of Scotland issue, these differences are matters of emphasis and not radical disagreements, and the four advocates of Union share a cohesive set of beliefs. England and Scotland are fundamentally similar, the Scots can easily adapt to English ways, and English goodwill can be assumed. The Scottish Nation is not very valuable in itself, and perhaps only “a shadow and an empty name,” as Clerk says: Scots patriotism should be redirected towards a Great Britain. There are slight differences as to how far this Great Britain will or should simply embody English values and customs at the expense of Scottish ones, but agreement that, in any case,
England is superior to any other country, in constitution, laws, and economic opportunities. All argue that only a permanent peace with England can give the security necessary for increased wealth, and for liberty from poverty and oppression. In addition, the very size of Great Britain will also increase security and trading possibilities: small countries are more likely to be despotic and inefficient (though Defoe dissents somewhat on this).

These views stand out more clearly when set against those of the Nationalists. For them, the need to preserve Scotland is, of course, axiomatic. Scottish customs are distinct and, whether or not superior to English ones (and they probably are), they are our own and worth preserving. The English have seldom shown good will towards the Scots and, given the chance, will deny them rights and draw away their wealth and assets. To give up independence and arms, and trust English assurances on economic opportunity and liberty is, as Fletcher says, “leaning on a shadow.” Further, the size of Great Britain is in itself a disadvantage. Scots would have very little say in regulating their own affairs, because the new parliament would be mainly English, and also too far away to be accountable. Scots would lose political rights and also the chance of prospering economically. All regulations would be for England’s benefit and, as was already happening, the distant capital would draw away the upper classes from Scotland, along with their wealth.

There is some common ground, of course. Priorities vary, but everyone values peace, security, wealth, and — with very distinctive glosses — liberty and perhaps democracy. (Not that they are always entirely frank. The Pro-Unionists cannot appear to be against liberty, and the Scottish Nationalists do not wish to sound too disdainful about wealth.) On a more pragmatic level, the problem becomes how to achieve the ideals that both sides value. Is liberty for individuals more likely to be attained by preserving the Scottish Nation or, as at least as Defoe and Paterson believe, by unifying the countries and parliaments? Will the Union bring greater prosperity to Scotland, or damaging exploitation? Contemporaries could only prophesy: we, of the twentieth century, should be in a position to answer such questions from history. But the answers are less evident than one would expect.
It seems reasonable to state that Scotland shared in the greater respect for individual human rights that developed, though gradually and tentatively, in the eighteenth century; but so did some other European countries without help from England. And the new Parliament's reintroduction of patronage into the Church of Scotland (1712) began two centuries of dissension.

It should be easier to assess whether Scotland benefited economically from the Union, or whether Fletcher's fears in this area were realized. The conventional view taught in high schools for many years has been that, even if the benefits of Union took some time to become evident, they undoubtedly arrived, and more or less as promised. Yet many of the Nationalists' predictions were verified. Some landowners did spend much more time in England, taking their wealth there and rackrenting tenants to pay for a more expensive lifestyle. Taxes increased and were more rigorously applied. Free trade with England was of limited benefit because Scotland had not much to offer that was salable there. And free trade with the plantations was for long theoretical because English merchants guarded their monopolies. Thirty years after Union, when almost all the Commissioners were dead (all except Seton, Clerk, and one other) there was still no perceptible improvement in economic activity or living standards, as Clerk tacitly admits. It was another decade before the economy began to pick up steam, and another half-century before wealth increased for the majority, and such a very long gap must raise doubts as to whether the Union really did benefit Scotland economically, or whether the improvement would have come about anyway, in an independent Scotland. (And it is worth reiterating that the Unionists' arguments were largely economic.)

But, whatever one's judgments on the consequences of Union, its advocates do raise important issues and argue a strong case. Might any of their ideas apply to the present situation? Only indirectly and partially, but here are a few suggestions. First, is Scotland now socially cohesive? Three hundred years ago, most Lowlanders (even Fletcher) felt they had more in common with the English than the Highlanders. Do some still feel this? And what is the attitude towards Glasgow in other parts
of Scotland? Then there is the debate about large and small countries. The advantages of being small are fairly obvious — closeness to a centre of power (though developments in transport and technology have made this less important), perhaps a more homogenous culture — but are there corresponding disadvantages? Might Scotland become parochial in the bad sense as many contemporaries, notably Seton, claimed it was in 1707, with resistance to truly new ideas — in business, technology, planning, arts — and too many corrupt and inefficient bureaucrats? If Westminster does remain sovereign, might a Scottish Parliament increase the psychological distance from London and encourage discrimination or neglect? (“If you want that, pay for it yourself.”)

On Scottish nationalism, how much validity is there in Clerk’s assertion that it tends to be negative, anti-English, rather than positive — pride in what is distinctively Scottish? Are Scots in danger of over-rating nationalism and under-rating the ideals of internationalism and concord that at least Defoe and Paterson valued? What values and what Scottish institutions do they want to preserve and encourage? For the contemporary situation, the main advantage of looking at the 1707 debate is that it prompts thought about all these issues. One danger should be avoided. Paterson especially, but also the other three writers, believed that the Union would work like a magic wand. The Parliaments would blend and — almost immediately — Scotland would flourish, or rather both Scotland and England would disappear into the shining new country of Great Britain. It did not happen like that, and conversely one should not assume that a new Scottish Parliament will, in itself, change Scotland for the better.

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1 “Such a Parcel of Rogues in a Nation,” as rewritten by Burns.
2 For Fletcher’s works, the references are to: Andrew Fletcher, Political
42 & 45.
3 “An Account of a Conversation concerning a Right Regulation of
Governments for the common Good of Mankind,” 214.
4 “A Speech upon the State of the Nation” (1701), 121.
5 “Second Discourse,” 60. It may seem difficult to take Fletcher seriously
as a proponent of liberty when he is notorious for proposing serfdom
for many of his countrymen, in the “Second Discourse”. But his argu-
ment in that essay is at least consistent. He wrote it during the famine,
with “so many thousands of our people ... at this day dying for want of
bread” (56) so that the choice seemed to be between serfdom and
death. And the serfs (or “servants” as Fletcher considers them) would
have some rights.
6 Writings of William Paterson (London, 1859), 3v. ed. Saxe Bannister. I,
173.
7 John Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England (Edinburgh,
8 John Clerk, Memoirs (Edinburgh, 1892), ed. John Gray, 221.
9 Ibid, 166.
10 William Seton, The Interest of Scotland in Three Essays (1700), II,
57 & 52.
11 “Scotland’s Great Advantages in a Union with England” (1706), 8. See
also, in particular, Seton’s speech of 2 Nov 1706, included in Defoe’s
History of the Union, 28-32.
12 Robertson, 149. (Parliamentary speech VII.)
13 This remains a subject for debate. See, for example, T.C. Smout’s
“Where had the Scottish economy got to by the end of the eighteenth
century?” in Istvan Hont, ed. Wealth and Virtue (Cambridge U.P.: 1983) and T.M. Devine’s “The Union of 1707 and Scottish Develop-
ment” (1985), in his Exploring the Scottish Past (East Lothian: Tuckwell, 1985). These discern rather more strength in the economy in the
first half of the century, but attribute it mainly to factors at work before
the Union.

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