Review Article by G. K. Peatling

“A REGION ONCE AGAIN”?

A critical reaction to Graeme Morton’s interpretation of Scottish identity


Scotland the mother country of worldwide people, a small nation, a region, a geographical expression, or any combination of these? Scottish identity and heritage is for many an object of pride and remembrance, but it is also a keenly contested political question. For Scottish Nationalists, the trajectory mapped out by certain European nations, including the Republic of Ireland, into prospering states within an integrated Europe poses a model at once appealing and problematic. In 1994, for Christopher Harvie, the “rise of regional Europe” provided both a structure within which to recover the ‘natural regionality of the British Isles’, and, for Scots, the prospect of Olympian amusement at the political contortions of those trying to maintain undivided British sovereignty at Westminster. Yet in truth, the implication that a “regional” status befits Scotland encapsulates the ambiguities of the Nationalist dynamic. According to this teleology, Scottish Nationalism would appear to have lagged behind other nationalisms sufficiently to miss out on the finite phase of independent European nation-statehood. Moreover, while a sense of Scottishness has by no means always gone hand-in-hand with a demand for Scottish independence, a rich and growing body of comparative literature has suggested that an aspiration to a politically independent state coterminous with the nation is a main (if not the main) definitive characteristic of nationalism. Logically, therefore, there would appear to be something acutely wrong with a nation
for so long without nationalism, or a national identity long lacking an aspiration to national independence.

Graeme Morton’s book *Unionist-nationalism* offers an inventive response to previous scholarship informed by the assumption of such a “failure” of Scottish identity. It can also be seen as one of the more arresting contributions to an academic, political and journalistic debate about Britishness, much of which has been conducted in the shadow of Linda Colley’s *Britons*. This paper will assess Morton’s argument in the light of other recent critical and historical commentary. It will be shown that Morton’s is a striking and creative attempt to map a genealogy of modes of expression in Scottish nationalism, according to which its current formations, particularly the campaigns of the Scottish National Party (SNP), should be identified as a powerful historical tradition rather than a belated attempt to catch up with other European nations. However, the principal weakness of Morton’s thesis is a failure to identify the diffuse and varied nature of contemporary and historical Scottish identities. This complexity suggests certain observations about common theoretical perspectives on nationalism (which can only be mentioned briefly here) and about the relationship between historical scholarship and the contemporary political context.

Morton’s study is focused by his belief – shared by a number of other writers – that Colley overstates the hegemony of British identities within modern Britain. Colley, he suggests, offers ‘a Whig interpretation of the formation of British national identity’ entertaining ‘the idea that nationalism of the periphery can be placed aside, and downgraded’. Morton rejects this assumption: ‘there is, of course, much commonality in the British experience, but it means something unique to each of the four nations. The falsity of the conceptualization of Great Britain as a unitary nation-state is visible culturally as well as institutionally’. Morton suggests this conceptualization is inadvertently echoed by much scholarship about mid-nineteenth-century Scottish nationalism, and even by historians such as Harvie and Richard Finlay.
who do not share Colley’s homogenizing predispositionvi. But notwithstanding the lack of revolutionary activity in Scotland in 1848, Morton insists that Scottish nationalism was not ‘inferior as an (abstract) nationalism’vii. The argument that nineteenth-century Scottish nationalism was weak is loaded down by the assumption that the parliamentary state was coterminous with civil society. In fact, Morton maintains, mid-nineteenth-century Scottish civil society was governed in the gap between the nation and the British stateviii. Because of differences between the twentieth-century state and the non-interventionist state of the nineteenth century, Morton argues, it is misleading to look for a Scottish nationalism of the period marked by a demand for a separate parliamentary nation-stateix. Self-government, but not necessarily legislative power, is the test of strength of nationalism and national identity, and the institutions effectively governing Scottish towns and cities in the years 1830-60 were not merely, as in most British towns and cities, predominantly local, but were buttressed by a set of voluntary societies which often possessed a “national” or “Scottish” remitx. Through such institutions, Morton suggests, the Edinburgh bourgeoisie, a powerful and integrated social elite, were thus able to ‘administer Scottish affairs – the nation – as if they had their own “state”’xi.

Morton finds the dominant paradigm in theoretical study of nationalism (associated with Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm)xii, according to which nationalism involves the imagination of a political sovereignty over a distinct “national” territory, inadequate to fertilize understanding of nationalism in Scotland in these circumstancesxiii. He invokes the work of Anthony Smith and John Armstrong to transcend this ‘strait-jacket’ of one-nation-one-state orthodoxyxiv. According to Smith in particular, nationalism is marked by a display of a pre-modern ethnie, a fluid and malleable (though not infinitely malleable) corpus of symbols, narratives and memories flagged by social and political elites to evoke a shared consciousness of particular images of nationsxv. Morton suggests that such a discourse or imagining of the Scottish nation is not necessarily coterminous with
parliamentary nationalism: even in the late twentieth century, Scottishness is not necessarily consonant with the SNP, so the absence in 1830-60 of a nationalist party or a party (such as the Liberals of the 1880s) with a Scottish home rule platform need not necessarily denote absence of national identityxvi. The language and symbols of a collective Scottish identity were evident from 1830 to 1860 in groups such as the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), obituaries for Sir Walter Scott, and campaigns for monuments to Scottish heroes such as William Wallace and Robert the Brucexvii, although none of these formations were explicitly associated with the advocacy of an independent Scottish state. Morton makes the arresting suggestion that, specifically in the period 1830-60, Scotland was a self-governing state, so had no need to seek independence through nationalist mobilization: ‘Unionist-nationalism’ instead was the ‘rational response’xviii. After this period however, the growing intervention of the British parliamentary state in Scottish civil society meant that the precondition of Scotland’s effective self-government was no longer in place; political demands for national independence were the logical corollary. If this suggestion were vindicated by the historical record, it would indeed not only explain the non-existence of powerful political nationalism in mid-nineteenth-century Scotland, but also locate those who currently favor independence within a continuity in Scottish society of long antecedents.

Morton argues ‘the explicit use of the pre-modern symbols of the Scottish ethnie in the mid-nineteenth century, with the aim of both strengthening the [Anglo-Scottish] Union and appealing to Scottish notions of independence’ can be described as ‘Unionist-nationalism’xix, and his demonstration of the sharing of certain symbols of the Scottish ethnie between current Scottish Nationalism and unionist-nationalism in his period shows him at his most impressive. In the mid nineteenth-century, Wallace and the Bruce’s military exploits were depicted as the basis of Scotland’s equality of status with England within the Union, and thus Scotland’s claim to be in control of its own destinies, independence of
Wallace and the Bruce’s battles against the English were thus ironically viewed as establishing a tradition relived by the contemporary Scottish regiments that fought with the English in the British empire, and also by those Scots who sought and obtained prosperity and position through the connection with England. Indeed, since a stable and equal Anglo-Scottish Union, the fruit of the victories of Wallace and the Bruce, was the foundation of Britain’s later success as a trading, military and imperial power, England too owed a large debt to these Scottish heroes. The refunctioning of these same symbols – particularly and famously the image of William Wallace framed by Mel Gibson’s internationally successful film *Braveheart* – in support of the SNP’s recent campaigns for Scottish independence is a striking example of the relevance of Morton’s application of Smith’s theories to modern Scottish history: truly it seems that widely different political meanings can be given to the same “national” symbols in different periods in order to reflect contemporary concerns. Thus, Morton suggests, a continuity in Scottish nationalism survives even though contemporary Unionist-nationalists (represented at least until recently by the Conservative and Unionist party) are a defeated minority. The appearance of discontinuity only arises from contextual factors, chiefly growing centralization and intervention by the British state increasingly undermining the extent to which Scotland was governed ‘outwith the central state administration’, thus ‘forcing Scottish national identity to change forever’. ‘Parliamentary nationalism was the inevitable consequence’: ‘Unionist-nationalism as the pinnacle of Scottishness was a candle in the wind; it was fixed to its own time and to its own place’.

Morton is thus at his most persuasive in showing how theories of nationalism explain the way symbols and icons of Scottish identity have been used at different moments. Three serious drawbacks to his hypothesis can however be cited. First, he lacks a sophisticated understanding of political movements and their possible independence from socio-economic structures and hegemonic class control. Second, he appears to
exaggerate the distance between Scottish identity and local and regional identity throughout the United Kingdom. Third, and most importantly, in spite of his efforts to chart long-term historical continuities, his understanding of Scottish nationalism is chronologically challenged.

Morton’s background in economic and social history is evident throughout his book, especially in his suggestions that ‘political’, ‘non-sociological’ theories of nationalism offer deficient understandings of the Scottish case. However, there is also unfortunately a failure to problematize a bland theorization of certain political formations as superstructures of a hegemonic class. In his central chapters Morton attempts to trace the existence of an elite that “governed” mid-century urban Scotland through local and voluntary institutions. The signifiers of coherence that he locates in this class are not substantive, and the attempt is further compromised by his alternation between the terms “subscriber population” and “bourgeoisie” to describe this governing group, the latter surely being a broader group. This is a serious weakness, since he treats this group as creators of collective Scottish identities, ‘that which manages or controls the use of “we”’, and thus, through organizations such as the NAVSR, ‘led Scottish society into a general understanding of its national identity during the middle years of the century’. The degree of “control” or “manipulation” which Morton implies this group exercised suggests here a return to Gellner’s theories of nationalism, and in any case, the NAVSR was surely too short-lived and minoritarian a movement to do the work Morton here accredits it. But even if the subscriber/bourgeoisie class exercised the degree of control Morton attributes to it, his emphasis of the demise of this system and thus of Unionist-nationalism after 1860 becomes problematic. It is forms of state intervention such as the creation of the Scottish Office, the extension of the franchise in 1884, and specifically the national education system developed after the Act of 1872, which are supposed to have speeded this transition, by taking control of urban Scotland out of the hands of its bourgeoisie. The development of
national education systems is an obvious candidate to figure in models of nation-formation or internal or external colonialism influenced by models of “social control” or of Gramscian hegemony. But this ubiquitous utility of national education as an instance in such models creates doubts as to whether it can furnish the extent of evidential support that is required. One’s suspicions are at least aroused where there is a failure to flag the possibility of resistant subaltern or local tendencies in the face of such state or “national” intervention.

Second, questions must be raised as to how far Morton’s definition of “nationalism” in mid-century Scotland occludes the existence of local or regional identities. This consideration is invited by Morton’s suggestions that the ‘effective’ state in mid-nineteenth-century urban Scotland was ‘local’: ‘When politics is brought into the equation, our “Scottish questions” should direct us to the town councils’. Morton’s entire focus on urban Scotland indeed suggests a questionable definition of “Scottish questions”. Morton argues that some local government and voluntary structures in Scotland had a national (Scottish) remit that they did not elsewhere in the United Kingdom. But this was neither ubiquitous nor inimical to exercising functions predominantly at a local level (especially within Edinburgh itself), and invites closer consideration of comparative reference points within the north Atlantic archipelago. As he appreciates, permissive powers granted by central government and civic identities facilitated the exercise of local power not just in Scottish towns and cities, but also elsewhere in Britain. There were also shared patterns of resistance to centralization, and shared enthusiasms for specifically local solutions, in England and Wales. Since differences in the ways in which these local powers were exercised in Scotland were largely matters of degree, this raises questions as to how far, according to Morton’s definition, nineteenth-century England (and/or Wales) might too be described as a self-governing civil society or even “state” in these years: but such a possibility would merely suggest that Morton’s definitions are too vague to be of practical use.
The strength of local and regional identities in this period is easy to underestimate\textsuperscript{xxxvii}. Even in southern Ireland, which is in many ways where one would most expect to find a predominance of national identification, Theo Hoppen has argued that the local and not the national was the default mode of politics in this period\textsuperscript{xxxviii}. From another point of view, there is an argument that, viewed in a comparative context, it is the strength of \textit{British} identities in the Scottish constituency Morton isolates which is most salient and distinct, even Unionist-nationalist Scots largely lacking the misrecognition of Britain as England so common in England itself\textsuperscript{xxxix}.

This criticism would be of small account if, as Morton suggests, Unionist-nationalism ‘as the pinnacle of Scottishness was a candle in the wind … fixed to its own time and to its own place’. But the inaccuracy of such an assumption that Scottish national identity “changed forever” by the final quarter of the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{xl} and the chronologically challenged nature of his entire hypothesis constitute the third and most serious criticism of his book. Morton appears to be on comfortable ground in suggesting that the version of Unionist-nationalism put forward by the Conservative and Unionist party at the 1997 United Kingdom general election was clearly not ‘the pinnacle of Scottishness’, since the Scottish Conservatives then failed to win a single parliamentary seat\textsuperscript{xli}. However, he is surely wrong to imply that this trend of decline was firmly established with the increasing intervention of the British state in Scottish civil society from the end of the nineteenth century. If Unionist-nationalism was the creed of the Scottish Conservatives in 1997, it was surely also the creed of the Scottish Unionists in 1900 and in the 1950s, when a similar psephological assessment would surely suggest it remained ‘the pinnacle of Scottishness’\textsuperscript{xlii}. Morton misses this point because the evidence that he presents in charting the fate of Unionist-nationalism between the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries is sharply limited: one \textit{Evening News} article in 1906 is hardly an impressive data bank\textsuperscript{xliii}.

Part of Morton’s difficulty here may lie in the fact that though rejecting theories of nationalism such as Eric
Hobsbawm’s, Morton remains attached to a Marxist-historicist model of stages of social evolution, Hobsbawm, indeed, being called as an expert witness on the differences in the scale of activity undertaken by the nineteenth- and twentieth-century British states. But structures of state intervention in Britain, in the sense that Hobsbawm means, were hardly identical throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, far from supporting the notion that the increased presence of the British state in Scotland accounts for the demise of what Morton calls “Unionist-nationalism”, commentators who focus more closely on the period largely missing from Morton’s analysis actually chart the reduction in intervention in Scottish civil society by the British state as a source of the decline of this formation. Specifically, the resistance to state expenditure through the Scottish Office associated with British governments in the 1980s and 1990s is charged with evoking a political nationalist response in Scotland. Suggestively, in a famous book critiquing a generation of Marxist historians such as Hobsbawm, Gareth Stedman Jones noted that stadial models of social evolution, combined with the tendency of historians to specialize in particular periods, leads to inaccurate assumptions about surrounding periods, especially earlier periods conceptualized as “traditional society”: ‘the historian should refrain from calling the history he does not know “traditional society”’. Morton similarly should refrain from conceiving of the period of Scottish history about which he lacks evidence as “post-Unionist-nationalist”.

Beyond these specific criticisms, Morton’s thesis prompts broader considerations. First, Morton rejects with some passion the idea that Scottish nationalism was a failure in the period under his review. His argument thus still evinces an assumption that a western European civil society which lacked national independence and failed to manifest a demand for it in this period would have failed. This seems a curious assumption. Those locations which did experience nationalist revolutions in 1848, given the want of tangible achievement by the revolutionaries, could have been forgiven for dissenting from the teleological assumption that nation-
alism was a blessing. A review of the subsequent twentieth-century consequences, especially of ethnic nationalism, also presents a distinctly checkered record. A national identity (for such many Scots certainly had) to which the question of independence, whether in a “parliamentary” or a “local” state, was simply not an issue would surely transcend many of these difficulties, and it is at least questionable whether it should rightly be assumed a failure.

Second, the study of nationality in Scotland obtains a broader interest from the presence of a combination of two forms of national identity: that of an established state or dominant culture, and that of a sub-state nationalism struggling for expression within a larger body politic. There is a tendency within thematic commentary on nationalism to exaggerate the modal differences between these two forms, often around a theorized distinction between the history of dominant cultures’ (or western or “civic”) nationalisms and colonized peoples’ (or “ethnic”) nationalisms. Cognate tendencies in writing about Scottish national identity tend thus to depict it in the light of internal colonialism, suggest it was silenced by the long-established effects of the British empire, or otherwise to theorize some moment of transition between the predominance of two such modes. Morton’s effort to trace the rise of political nationalism or “nationalist nationalism” at the expense of “Unionist-nationalism” largely falls into the latter category, with the proviso that an aspiration to practical independence has been continuous. But in fact even this narrative may overestimate the extent of a “radical break” in the ongoing process of negotiation between Scottishness and Britishness. Scottishness remains a sub-state nationalism within the UK, and a facet of a dominant culture, and nationalist amnesia should not blind us to the latter. The boundary between these two forms is fluid indeed, since even nationalisms in dominant or established cultures are as capable as those of colonized peoples of expressing themselves through private spheres and everyday life. And, as is illustrated by a lurid example of anti-Irish propaganda cited by Morton from 1852 from the Edinburgh Irish Mission and Protestant
Instituteli, even the most dominant culture is capable of ethnic mobilization through conceptualizing itself as under threat of attack or infiltration.

Third, while Morton accuses Colley of articulating a ‘Whig interpretation of the formation of British national identity’, it is noticeable that others suggest not only that Colley understates the hegemony of the concept of “Britain” within the north Atlantic archipelago, but also that she is to some extent responsible for the concept’s demise. If this argument bears the impress of one of the weaker conservative attempts to silence liberal academics (and there have been many weak such attempts), it at least suggests that criticisms of Colley for overstating the hegemony of Britishness can also be exaggerated. But in any case Morton does not seriously propose that the history of Scottish and British identities should transcend Whig interpretations. In 1995, shortly before his death, Raphael Samuel, in a criticism of Colley similar to Morton’s, pointedly predicted that if Colley’s Britain were to become unforged (as she herself hinted in her closing passages), the new present would then be read into the past. Separation would come to be seen as the logical consummation of every phase of Scottish history:

Despite a modernist attention to cultural difference, [Colley] offers us a unionist version of British history, and an imperial view of national character. National expansion is the unifying thread of her narrative, the triumph of loyalism its terminus ad quem. Moments of convergence and coalescence are highlighted … while she passes lightly over matters where explosive contradictions are more apparent.

If, as seems likely at the time of writing, the breakup of Britain proceeds apace; … and if, after the next general election, a Scottish government is established at Edinburgh, followed in due course, as many radicals will hope, by the proclamation of a Scottish Republic, it may be that a very different
“four nations” history of Britain will become the order of the day, one which focuses on the tenacity of our island ethnicities, and allows more conceptual space for schisms and secessions.\textsuperscript{lv}

Morton’s effort to find a narrative of separation in Scottish history, even in periods when the proposal was almost universally deemed “simply insane”\textsuperscript{lv}, fits this description: it is the “Whig” interpretation of the history of a “dis-United Kingdom”. But it has arrived before all the preconditions are in place, and perhaps these preconditions will never arise. For surely Arthur Aughey is right\textsuperscript{lv}: the majority of the UK population, as a whole and in each nation, continues to vote for parties that are, in the broadest sense, unionist. In England, little politically coherent opposition is expressed to the supposed existence of non-English votes for English measures. If the resulting position is anomalous (or according to the common expression in Britain, “half-baked federalism”), instability may be no inevitable consequence, since the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom have a long history of anomaly. Moreover, for its part, majority opinion in Scotland may continue to express Scottish identities, without giving strong grounds for aspersions as to the anomaly or weakness of Scottishness. If this proves indeed to be the future for Scotland, Morton’s book may suffer as seeming to offer an unnecessary explanation for a nonexistent historical anomaly. Whatever the future does bring, I sincerely hope that this is not the book’s fate: it is too interesting and too scholarly for that. And tangible pieces of evidence for Morton’s thesis that “the very concept of the British “nation-state” is untenable”\textsuperscript{lvii} can be found, notably the continued existence under the Union of the separate Scottish legal system, with its distinctive third possible verdict. But at the end of Morton’s book, one feels that his case, tried under Scottish laws, would certainly yield a verdict of “not proven”.

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End Notes


xv Morton, *Unionist-nationalism*, 57-60.

xvi Morton, *Unionist-nationalism*, 133.

xviii Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 152.
xix Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 183.
xxi Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 179-82.
xxiii Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 188, 189.
xxiv Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 189.
xxv Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 97-132.
xxvi Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 134.
xxvii Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 154.
xxviii Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 57: Another curious reading of Anthony Smith and John Armstrong appears on Unionist-nationalism, 59 in Morton’s suggestion that a nation is ‘increasingly formed in the image of older ethnic symbols’. The implied trajectory of gradual return to “authentic” ethnic “origins” is surely not warranted by Smith’s notion of nations as fluid long-term processes.
xxix Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 136-7, 150.
xxx Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 188, 196.
xxxii Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 196, 135.

xxxv Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 136-7, 148, 150.

xxxvi Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 86, 30-5.


xl Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 188.


xiv Morton, Unionist-nationalism, 23.


Morton, *Unionist-nationalism*, 83. Elsewhere Morton seems to place a lesser emphasis on the anti-Irish element of the rhetoric of the NAVSR (which contrasted the lavishness of the British Exchequer’s spending in Ireland with its alleged miserliness in Scotland) than he did in the doctoral dissertation on which his book is based. This is possibly a result of the way in which his argument leads him to exaggerate a record of affinity between national identity in Scotland and Irish nationalism as subaltern movements of the “Celtic fringe”.


